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Short Changing Short-Term Risk:
A Study of Superfund Remedy Selection
John S. Applegatet and Steven M. Weslohtt
Unlike most environmental statutes, CERCLA requires a lengthy period of
labor-intensive activity to achieve its clean-up goals. This aspect of the
Superfund program does not receive sufficient attention in policy and legal
analyses of CERCLA, nor during site-specific remedy selection
decisionmaking. The risks of the remediation period-to workers, to site
neighbors, and to the natural environment-are substantial, as this Article
illustrates. However, the confusing and sometimes dismissive treatment of
remediation risk in the EPA 's detailed guidance for Superfund
decisionmakers invites the neglect of the short-term effectiveness criterion in
the remedy selection process. A study of remedy selection documents in one
EPA region suggests that this invitation has been understood and accepted by
EPA officials. Remediation risk appears to play a very minor role in the site-
specific decisions examined in this Article; indeed, in some cases the relevant
managers seemed not to understand that remediation risk had any role to play
at all. Since a more thorough consideration of remediation risk would
probably suggest a different outcome in at least some site-specific remedy
selection decisions, the EPA should implement administrative reforms to
ensure the consistent and adequate inclusion of remediation risk criteria in
the Superfund remedy selection process.
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Introduction
A Superfund project is major surgery on the environment. Superfund,
which is shorthand for the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),' requires the clean-up of
hazardous waste sites that release or threaten to release pollutants into the
environment. However, despite beneficent intentions, skillful execution, and
salutary results, the remedy itself is by no means a benign process. Superfund
projects are heavy construction sites and present, in addition to the hazardous
substances that are being cleaned up, all of the hazards normally associated
with such activities. Construction and transportation accidents; pollution of
the air and water by disturbing contaminated soil and sediment; destruction of
ecosystems by stripping off soil and excavating wetlands; and exposure to
hazardous substances during treatment, transportation, or disposal operations
are just some of the physical effects that these activities have on project
workers, neighboring populations, and the surrounding natural environment.
The Superfund remedy, in short, poses its own serious risks, which the
surgeon fails to consider at the patient's peril.
The present study of the decisionmaking process at Superfund sites
demonstrates, however, that remediation risks are routinely marginalized and
frequently ignored in the remedy selection process for Superfund sites. The
remediation risks from construction and transportation activities are
I. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1994) [hereinafter CERCLA].
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substantial2 and very real-insurers, for example, predict them with profitable
accuracy. Hundreds of people die in construction and truck and train
transportation accidents every year, and thousands more are injured. The toxic
properties of Superfund sites, on the other hand, by and large pose significant
but not dramatic risks.' Moreover, the toxic risks tend to be statistically
calculated rather than experientially determined.4 So, in the extreme case, the
short-term risks of remediation could swamp the long-term risks of the
underlying environmental contamination.5 There is an actuarial and historical
certainty that individuals (most likely remediation workers) will be killed and
seriously injured in the process of reducing the long-term risks posed by
hazardous waste sites. It is therefore melodramatic but not inaccurate to regard
the remediation decision as a life-and-death issue. At a minimum, the risks of
fatality associated with remediation should be carefully considered in
selecting the remedy for a Superfund site, because different remedial
techniques have very different risk consequences.
The phenomenon of ignoring remediation risks can be traced to a general
tendency in environmental statutes (and probably in most regulatory statutes)
2. See infra Section I.B.
3. See MICHAEL GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK 176-78 (1994); James T.
Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, Human Health Risk Assessments for Superfund, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 573,
608-10 (1994) [hereinafter Human Health Risk].
4. See Joshua T. Cohen et al., Life Years Lost at Hazardous Waste Sites, 17 RISK ANALYSIS
419, 422 (1997); see also Michael B. Gerrard & Deborah Goldberg, Facilities in Hazardous Waste
Cleanup, 214 N.Y. L.J. 1, 3 (1995) (noting the difference between actuarial accident data and
conservative risk assessments). Gerrard and Goldberg also found many newspaper reports of
occupational and construction injuries associated with active and inactive Superfund hazardous waste
sites. See id.
5. See RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADE-OFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 16-17
(John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995) [hereinafter RISK VERSUS RISK]; Frank B. Cross,
Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851, 900-06 (1996); W.
Kip Viscusi, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 5, 12-13 (1994); W. Kip Viscusi & Richard
Zeckhauser, The Fatality and Injury Costs of Expenditures, 8 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 19, 19, 21, 36-39
(1994). Some commentators are more cautious when they assert this effect. See Cohen et al., supra note
4, at 423 (analyzing a hypothetical case study); Alan F. Hoskin et al., Estimated Risk of Occupational
Fatalities Associated with Hazardous Waste Site Remediation, 14 RISK ANALYSIS 1011, 1016 (1994);
Thomas Mar et al., Physical Injury Risk Versus Risk from Hazardous Waste Remediation, 17 REG.
TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 130, 134 (1993); Gerrard & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 3 (considering
both active and inactive waste sites).
It is not, however, the purpose of this Article to undertake a quantitative comparison between
baseline and remediation risks or to generalize about what such a comparison would show. The
remediation risks are very different from the baseline risks with which the regulation of hazardous
wastes usually concerns itself. As a result, the formal, quantitative comparison of baseline and
remediation risks is an exceptionally difficult and controversial problem in its own right and thus beyond
the scope of this Article. See infra note 16 and accompanying text; cf John S. Applegate, When the Cure
Is Worse Than the Disease, Presentation at the Symposium on Risk, Science, and Law, Society for Risk
Analysis Annual Meeting (Dec. 10, 1996) (transcript on file with the author) (describing Superfund
remediation risk as a problem in comparative risk analysis).
Yale Journal on Regulation
to envision only two states of the world: the pre-regulation or baseline state,
which is the condition that the statute seeks to remedy; and the post-regulation
or target state, in which the problem has been resolved to the legislature's
satisfaction.6 Legislation typically specifies in detail the characteristics of the
target state, such as the residual level of risk that ought to be tolerated in air
emissions, water discharges, or solid waste disposal. However, far less
thought goes into the desired characteristics of the transition period during
which the world moves from the baseline to the target condition.7 Under the
federal air, water, and solid waste statutes, the transition period may involve
installing pollution control devices or reconfiguring a process to prevent the
pollution before it begins. For these traditional pollution problems, the
principal transition issues are the cost and duration of the transition in relation
to the magnitude of the baseline hazard and the targeted improvement. Despite
the fact that pollution-control techniques can pose their own risks, these
remain a relatively minor aspect of pollution control decisions.
At first glance, CERCLA seems to differ in this respect from the
traditional pollution control statutes. Since CERCLA operates retrospectively,
requiring the clean-up of past pollution to which humans and the environment
remain exposed,9 the clean-up of Superfund sites has a distinctive temporal
element that ought to make the remediation period difficult to ignore. It is
pictured in Figure 1.
6. Cf John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure in
Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277, 305-06 (1992) (defining the "predicate" and "target"
of environmental statutes); Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENvTL.
L.J. 300, 338-39 (1995) (arguing that environmental law focuses too much on ends and not on means).
But see Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New Framework to Link
Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J. 803, 807-08 (1996-1997) (arguing that
legislation is too prescriptive as to means).
7. See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 5, at 19, 38 (attributing this phenomenon to the long-
term risk-reducing motivation for the creation of the short-term risks).
8. These risks have aroused growing interest. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE
VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993); RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 5; W. KiP Viscusi, FATAL TRADE-OFFS (1992);
Cross, supra note 5. The problem was described nearly two decades ago in LESTER LAVE, THE
STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION 15-16 (1981), wherein Lave advocated the use of "risk-risk"
analysis.
9. The corrective action provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),
42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1994), are also retrospective, but RCRA is mainly a standard prospective pollution
control statute.
Vol. 15:269, 1998
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FIGURE 1
Baseline and Target Risks
Polluted Remediation Foreseeable
Present Period Future
Baseline Risks Transition Risks Target or Residual
Risks
The baseline risks are those that Superfund was originally designed to fix,
with Love Canal as the archetype: chemically contaminated soil and
groundwater in basements, backyards, and schools.' ° The target state is
defined by compliance with other environmental standards and the
achievement of a low but greater-than-zero level of residual risk. The residual
risks tend to be lesser versions of the baseline risks. That is, they are the
baseline risks as ameliorated by treatment, removal, or isolation of the original
contamination." The remediation activities occur in the intervening transition
period and may last years (even decades at more complex sites), costing many
millions of dollars, and employing hundreds of remediation workers.
Nevertheless, CERCLA imitates its pollution control counterparts'
sketchy treatment of the remediation activities themselves. The existence of
remediation risks has been pointed out by several commentators, 2 and the
EPA's failure to consider the risks seriously in site-specific remedy selection
decisions has not gone unnoticed. 3 However, evidence of their existence is
haphazard, and evidence of the failure of decisionmakers to consider them
remains entirely anecdotal and impressionistic. This Article seeks to fill these
gaps with a systematic analysis of the types of hazards created by remediation
activities, the approximate magnitude of the risks they pose, and the extent to
which the EPA uses (or fails to use) remediation risk data in remedy selection.
Part I of the Article sets out in detail the many physical impacts of
remediation. Even though only very tentative estimates of the quantitative
10. The EPA requires a "baseline risk assessment" to measure these threats to human health and
the environment. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(d)(1) (1997) (emphasis added).
11. Consistent with the usual emphasis on the baseline and target, two major empirical studies of
CERCLA remedy selection in the legal literature have focused on the sources of baseline and target risks
and the relative costs of achieving different target risk levels. See James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi,
The Benefits and Costs of Regulatory Reforms for Superfund, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 159, 186 (1997)
[hereinafter Benefits and Costs] (concluding that the great majority of the cost of remediation is
associated with the last few increments of risk reduction); Human Health Risk, supra note 3, at 608
(concluding that most of the risk considered in RODs was from the long-term exposure scenarios).
12. See John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in Itself. The Role of Risk Assessment in
Environmental Decision-Making, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1643, 1653-54 (1995); see also supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
13. See infra Section I.C.
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magnitude of these risks are possible, the existing data reveal a distinctive and
serious risk profile resulting from exposure to hazardous substances,
construction work, transportation, and environmental contamination. Risks to
remediation workers are emphasized because workers bear the brunt of
remediation risks and because worker risks are almost entirely ignored in the
public consideration of CERCLA remedy selection.'n
Part II reviews the legal framework for remedy selection generally and for
the consideration of remediation risks in particular. While CERCLA and the
EPA's interpretations in the National Contingency Plan (NCP) 5 and guidance
documents nominally take full account of remediation risk (which the EPA
confusingly calls "short-term effectiveness"), they nonetheless relegate
remediation risk to a subordinate role in site-specific remedy selection
decisions. In Part II we also address the appropriateness of incorporating
voluntarily undertaken worker risk in the remedy selection process.
In Part III, we describe a study of the role of remediation risk in the
remedy selection records of decision (RODs) for Superfund sites in the
industrial Midwest. Our review of the RODs confirms our hypothesis that
remediation risks do not weigh heavily in remedy selection decisions. Indeed,
we find that the RODs rarely even consider all of the elements of remediation
risk that are identified by the EPA's guidance documents as relevant to
remedy selection, and that the RODs often betray a fundamental
misapprehension of the role of remediation risk in the EPA's analysis.
Part IV discusses the significance of these findings and recommends
changes in the administration of the Superfund program to address them.
While comparing different types of risk is difficult and fraught with
uncertainty, the consideration of remediation risks should have a significant
impact on the choice among remedial actions. The failure to consider
remediation risks means that remedy selection decisions are being made and
reviewed without full information concerning the consequences of the
decision. While the statutory machinery is in place to repair this problem, we
recommend that greater internal legal and managerial attention be paid to this
issue, and that appropriate revisions be made in the regulatory framework that
governs remedy selection.
I. The Problem of Remediation Risk
The thesis of this Article is that the EPA's remedy selection decisions for
Superfund sites, as reflected in its RODs, fail to give adequate consideration
14. See Hoskin et al., supra note 5, at 1011.
15. The National Contingency Plan is the administrative blueprint for CERCLA. The remedy
selection procedures and standards are set out at 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.400-.435 (1997).
Vol. 15:269, 1998
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to remediation risks. As a first step, we describe the nature of remediation risk
with two goals in mind. First, we want to establish that remediation risks are
significant, that is, that they are sizable enough to warrant serious attention in
the EPA's remedy selection decisions. Precise quantification of remediation
risks would be ideal, but quantification is in fact an extremely uncertain
enterprise'6 and is not necessary for present purposes. Second, we want to
identify the sources, types, and receptors of remediation risks in order to
support the argument that the thorough consideration of remediation risk
would make a significant difference in remedy selection decisions in the long
run.
17
A. The Life Cycle of a Superfund Site
We must begin with some terminology because, as will become clear, one
reason for the lack of consideration of remediation risk is the EPA's use of
confusing terms to describe it. Consideration of the entire life cycle of a
Superfund site expands on the baseline-target chart set out in Figure 1:
FIGURE 2
Site Life Cycle
Uncontrolled Polluted Remediation Foreseeable Long-Term
Past Present Period Future Stewardship
Baseline Transition Target or Residual
The uncontrolled past includes the activities that led to hazardous materials
being released into the environment.' 8 The polluted present-the baseline
condition-is the state of affairs that needs to be corrected. The target state is
the foreseeable future of the site, as defined by risk-based standards and the
requirements of other environmental statutes. The target risk level is the
16. While identifying the sources and receptors of remediation risks is a fairly straightforward
process, quantifying those risks is currently difficult. The paucity of data on remediation risk is itself
some of the best evidence of the scant attention that remediation risk receives in Superfund remedy
selection. See Hoskin et al., supra note 5, at 1012. Moreover, the terms in which most remediation risks
are measured differ from the metrics used for long-term risks. For the latter, the EPA uses the familiar
excess individual cancer risk, as expressed in the regulatory risk range, I x 10' to I x 10" . See 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2) (1997). For the former, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) and other agencies use total actual deaths and injuries, injuries per mile or per person-hour, and
other measures. Thus, quantitative statements about the magnitude of various remediation risks, to say
nothing of comparisons with other risks, must be made cautiously.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. The "release," CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1994), of a "hazardous
substance," § 101(14), into the "environment," § 101(8), is the trigger for CERCLA remedial action, see
§ 104, and liability, see § 107(a).
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residual risk after clean-up activities are substantially complete. Finally, long-
term stewardship is required to minimize further exposure to hazardous
materials that remain in place, either as residual contamination or as deliberate
disposal, after achievement of the target state. 19 "Stewardship" in this context
refers to the activities required to maintain the effectiveness of the selected
remedy. They range from routine maintenance of containment structures, to
documenting the remaining hazards for future generations, to land use
restrictions in deeds or ordinances. The remediation period bridges the two
past and two present periods. It effectuates the transition from the baseline
condition to the target, cleaned-up state.
The target (or residual) risk is easily determined in theory, as it is the legal
standard that the EPA must meet. As interpreted in the EPA's regulations, it is
a range spanning two orders of magnitude from 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1,000,000
excess lifetime risk of cancer.2" On the other hand, baseline risks are more
variable since they depend on the particular conditions at each site. Ideally,
any risk greater than the target would be eligible for clean-up, but studies of
Superfund sites that have been willing to generalize2" have found that the
baseline risks are relatively low 22 and that they may even overlap the target
levels.23 The context in which remediation risk must be considered, therefore,
is the difference between the baseline and target risks. In other words, the
remediation risk is one of the "costs" of purchasing the improvement in public
health represented by the increment between the baseline and the target risks.
The ultimate normative question for Superfund is whether that is a worthwhile
19. See generally Alex S. Karlin, How Long Is Clean? The Temporal Dimension to Protecting
Human Health Under Superfund, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1994, at 6, 48 (distinguishing
between the foreseeable future use of a site and its indefinite long-term use and arguing that the remedy
selection should focus on the former and not the latter).
20. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2) (1997). One study notes, however, that the EPA has
tolerated maximum cancer risks up to I in 100 at a 'substantial proportion of sites. See Katherine D.
Walker et al., Confronting Superfund Mythology: The Case of Risk Assessment and Management, in
ANALYZING SUPERFUND 25, 31 (Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995). Obviously, the
higher the target risk, the smaller the difference between it and the baseline risk.
21. The National Research Council, for example, was unwilling to do so. See NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 19 (1991).
22. See GERRARD, supra note 3, at 176-78; Human Health Risk, supra note 3, at 608-10; Gerrard
& Goldberg, supra note 4, at 2. Hamilton and Viscusi emphasized that the substantial risks of Superfund
sites arise from long-term uncontrolled exposures rather than current conditions. See Human Health
Risk, supra note 3, at 608.
The EPA's risk comparison exercises, while not strictly quantitative, consistently ranked
Superfund sites low in risk relative to other environmental problems. See SCIENCE ADVISORY BD., U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 50, 57 (1990); 1 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED
BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 30, 42, 49, 55, 75 (1987).
23. In their hypothetical case study, Cohen et al. use 3 x 10 as the lifetime risk of cancer from
exposure to site contamination. See Cohen et al., supra note 4, at 420. This figure is derived from their
review of Superfund baseline risk assessments. See id.
Vol. 15:269, 1998
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bargain at a given site. However, this Article does not directly address the
normative question. The discussion here is limited to whether remediation
risks are adequately considered in the remedy selection process.
B. The Physical Effects of Remediation
Remediation risk can be and has been largely ignored in the selection of
remedies for most Superfund sites. This is in part an artifact of the baseline-
target orientation of regulatory statutes. It is also undoubtedly due in part to
the familiar and voluntary nature of the risks assumed by the remediation
workers. Fundamentally, a Superfund clean-up site is a heavy industrial or
construction facility, and such activities are not typically of great public
interest. For whatever reason, the remediation risks seem minor by
comparison to the hazards of the polluted present and are thus often
overlooked.24 We now turn to a discussion of the types of remediation risk
commonly present at Superfund sites. This section concludes with a
description of the remediation risks posed by federal facilities, since they
combine remediation risks in a particularly dramatic manner.
Superfund sites pose a wide variety of remediation risks. Remediation
risks are not a monolithic entity or a single number that can be plugged into
remedy selection calculations. Clean-up sites subsume many risk-creating
activities. The activities create the danger of different kinds of undesirable
effects, and those effects can befall different victims, human and otherwise.
To present a systematic account of remediation risks, therefore, it is essential
to distinguish among categories of sources, types, and receptors of risk.
First, the clearest way to understand the sources of the physical effects of
remediation is to see a clean-up project for what it is-a construction site and
industrial operation. Construction and transportation risks account for the
great majority of the fatalities suffered by remediation workers.25 Cleaning up
Superfund sites also requires some or all of the following kinds of operations:
24. Superfund sites consistently rank higher in the lay public's perception of risks than in the
EPA's evaluation of the risks that the sites pose. See BREYER, supra note 8, at 21 tbl.4, 33, 34 tbl.6.
25. See Hoskin et al., supra note 5, at 1015. For the remainder of this part, we will cite specific
sources for particular points. However, on the more general discussion of the identity and sources of
remediation risks, we have relied generally on our review of the RODs themselves and on the following:
CONSORTIUM FOR ENVTL. RISK EVAL., HEALTH AND ECOLOGICAL RISKS AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX 3-2 (1995) [hereinafter CERE]; NATIONAL INST. FOR
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE SITE ACTIVITIES
(1985) [hereinafter OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY GUIDANCE]; OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, HAZARDS
AHEAD: MANAGING CLEANUP WORKER HEALTH AND SAFETY AT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX
(1993) [hereinafter OTA]; WORKER PROTECTION DURING HAZARDOUS WASTE REMEDIATION (Lori P.
Andrews ed., 1990); Hoskin et al., supra note 5, at 1012-14; Curtis C. Travis et al., Evaluation of
Remediation Worker Risk at Radioactively Contaminated Work Sites, 35 J. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 387
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1) restricting site access and imposing institutional controls to limit post-
remediation land use;
2) decontaminating, decommissioning (shutting down), and demolishing
buildings and other structures;
3) handling hazardous materials in tanks, ponds, pits, drums, and other
containers;
4) managing contaminated media such as soil, sediment, surface water, and
groundwater;
5) treating wastes or contaminated media to stabilize, compact, or neutralize
it; and
6) transporting hazardous materials away from a site and transporting
construction and treatment equipment and materials to it.
26
This section's description of remediation risks is organized around these
activities.
Second, remediation risks consist of both (i) the toxic and unfamiliar risks
associated with the hazard that triggered the clean-up in the first place, and (ii)
the mechanical or accident-related risks associated with the physical demands
of construction and transportation work. We call these two risk subsets
materials risks-which are typically toxic but can also be radiologic,
flammable, or corrosive-and conventional risks, respectively. 2' For a variety
of reasons, it is common in environmental law to treat these types of hazards
very differently. For our purposes, however, familiar accident risks are an
integral part of the analysis.29 These risks can be large or small depending on
the level of exposure.3°  ,
(1993); Gerrard & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 1-2 (reviewing newspaper stories). An informative tale of
exposure pathways can be found in OFFICE OF ENVTL. MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FINAL WASTE
MANAGEMENT PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 5-38 (1997) [hereinafter
WMPEIS].
26. See OTA, supra note 25, at 2 (listing operations that remediation workers must perform).
Hamilton and Viscusi break down the remedies for soil as follows: institutional controls, containment,
removal, treatment, and containment with removal. See Benefits and Costs, supra note 11, at 198 tbl.6.
They break down the remedies for groundwater into institutional controls and treatment. See id. OTA
adds the risks to workers engaged in emergency response. See OTA, supra note 25, at 2, 41-43.
27. This distinction is drawn, for example, in Travis et al., supra note 25, at 388. The EPA's Risk
Assessment Guidance for Superfund distinguishes three types of risks: (i) exposure to hazardous
substances during on-site remedial activities; (ii) injury due to physical hazards such as explosions, heat
stress, and precarious work environments; and (iii) exposure to hazardous substances during emergency
response activities. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDANCE FOR
SUPERFUND: HUMAN HEALTH EVALUATION MANUAL, PART C, RISK EVALUATION OF REMEDIAL
ALTERNATIVES 22 (1991) [hereinafter RAGS].
28. Cf. Herbert Inhaber, Risk with Energy from Conventional and Nonconventional Sources, 203
SCIENCE 718, 720-21 (1979) (distinguishing between "materials" and "construction" risks in comparing
the risks of alternative energy technologies).
29. Stated in terms of familiar and unfamiliar, the phenomenon of ignoring remediation risks
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Third, it is important to distinguish between different receptors of risks.
After all, a hazard is not a risk until someone or something is exposed to the
hazard.3' The primary receptors of remedial risks are (i) project workers,
including both those regularly employed at the site and transportation
workers; (ii) the general public, including immediate neighbors, affected area
population, and residents of transportation corridors; and (iii) the natural
world, especially sensitive ecosystems like wetlands in and around the site.
Each receptor is potentially exposed both to materials and conventional risks.
The relationships among these variables is summarized in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Risk Sources and Receptors
REMEDIATION RISK REMEDIATION RISK RECEPTORS
SOURCES M = materials risk, C = conventional risk
CAPITALS = relatively larger risk
lower case = relatively smaller risk
Worker Public Ecosystem
Access Controls
D,D&D M,C m
Hazardous Materials M,c m M
Contaminated Media M,C M M,C
Treatment & Disposal M,c m M
Transportation M,C M,C
As Table 1 indicates 32 and the following text describes, remediation activities
often include both materials and conventional risks and always have
reflects the risk-perception literature's finding that unfamiliar and unknown risks cause more concern
regardless of their relative quantitative magnitudes. See, e.g., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280 (1987). It has also been
argued that remediation risks are voluntarily assumed and therefore merit different consideration. See
RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 5, at 16-17.
30. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 21, at 19 (discussing the difficulty of
generalizing about Superfund risks due to variation in exposures).
31. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 19-28 (1983) (describing the general framework for risk
assessment).
32. The table reflects the approximate relative risks that are described in the remainder of this
section. The absence of a receptor (e.g., ecosystem harm from waste transportation) or a risk type (e.g.,
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implications for two or more groups of receptors. The exceptions are access
restrictions (fences and the like) and long-term institutional controls (deed
restrictions and the like), both of which are designed to isolate the site and its
contamination from types of intrusion or occupation that would result in
exposure to hazardous materials. Fences and deeds pose no real remediation
risks, but they are of debatable efficacy33 except as temporary removal actions
pending a permanent remedy.34
1. Decontamination, Decommissioning, Demolition
The first step at many Superfund sites is the management of existing
structures. They must be decontaminated before it is safe to demolish, reuse,
or mothball them.35 The contamination may involve only a few "hot spots"
that must be removed, or it may be ubiquitous. Likewise, the contamination
may consist of a relatively small amount of a hazardous substance on or in
building materials,36 or it may require the removal of the building materials
themselves, as in the case of asbestos.37 Decommissioning or shutting down a
building involves additional efforts to leave it in a safe configuration. Pipes
and tanks must be purged of water and other (often hazardous) liquids;
ventilation and heating systems must be cleaned of hazardous residues;
electrical connections must be severed; structurally unsound areas must be
shored up; and the building must be secured against infestation by birds and
rodents. Demolition techniques range from piece-by-piece dismantlement to
implosion, each with its own risks and benefits.
conventional risk from waste treatment) does not mean that there is no risk at all, but only that it is
relatively less important.
33. For a sample of this debate, see Susan C. Borinsky, The Use of Institutional Controls in
Superfund and Similar State Laws, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1995); David F. Coursen, Institutional
Controls at Superfund Sites, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,279 (1993); and Jeffrey Spear, Remedy
Selection Under CERCLA and Our Responsibilities to Future Generations, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 117,
143-44 (1993).
34. CERCLA specifically defines access restrictions, such as security fencing, as removal
actions. See CERCLA § 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1994).
35. See, e.g., H. Brown Co. Site, Walker, Mich., EPA ID MID017075136 (Sept. 30, 1992),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (requiring demolition of structures, solidification/stabilization of
contaminated soil in place, multilayer cap, fence, and institutional controls).
36. See, e.g., Laskin/Poplar Oil, Jefferson, Ohio, EPA ID OHD061722211 (June 29, 1989),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (requiring the draining of retention and fresh water ponds,
thermal treatment of contaminated soil, demolition and thermal treatment of contaminated structures,
construction of a multilayer cap, and access restrictions).
37. See, e.g., Fisher Calo Chem, Kingsbury, Ind., EPA ID IND074315896 (Aug. 7, 1990),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (requiring excavation and on-site incineration of the groundwater
source and PSB area, groundwater collection, treatment, and reinjection, and the installation of a new
water supply well).
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Decontamination and demolition activities, such as implosions or the
pressure-removal of lead paint, pose materials risks to site neighbors. For
example, at the South Bay Asbestos Site in Alviso, California, the EPA
advised neighbors to wet-mop the interiors and to spray down the exteriors of
their houses.3" Residents were concerned that they had not been further
warned to stay inside or to keep their windows closed.39 Access restrictions
and dust suppression measures certainly exist to minimize these hazards, but
the EPA's advice to South Bay residents confirms that the hazards cannot be
eliminated.
Decontamination and demolition hazards are dominated, however, by
conventional risks, which fall overwhelmingly on remediation workers. An
inter-agency manual for worker protection at hazardous waste sites lists a
wide range of safety hazards-typical of construction and industrial sites
generally-that are found at Superfund sites. 0 Basic safety hazards include
holes and ditches, precariously positioned objects, sharp edges, slippery
surfaces, steep grades, uneven terrain, and unstable surfaces. Since the
structures at Superfund sites are often old and dilapidated, the last is a very
substantial concern.4 Heavy equipment adds additional safety risks, and,
ironically, the use of protective equipment can impair a worker's vision,
hearing, and mobility, increasing the chance of accidents. Electrical hazards
may arise due to the use of electrical equipment and to contact with overhead
power lines, downed electrical cables, and buried cables severed during
remediation. Heat stress from the use of personal protective equipment is
another recurrent problem, and outdoor work in the winter creates a danger of
overexposure.
These conventional, even mundane, hazards must figure prominently in
any comprehensive evaluation of remediation risks. The typical iisks of
construction activities-falls, being struck by something, being caught in or
between objects, and electrical shock-account for 90% of construction
fatalities.42 Firm data on rates of conventional injuries are fairly difficult to
obtain because different agencies use different categories (e.g., construction
38. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPERFUND: EPA's COMMUNITY RELATIONS EFFORTS
COULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE 29 (1994), available in 1994 WL 814321 [hereinafter GAO].
39. See id.
40. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY GUIDANCE, supra note 25, at 2-1 to 2-3.
41. See, e.g., CERE, supra note 25, at 3-6 (describing difficulties of remediating Manhattan
Project-era sites).
42. See NATIONAL INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., FATAL INJURIES TO WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980-1989, at 8-9 (1993)
[hereinafter NIOSH]; OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ANALYSIS
OF CONSTRUCTION FATALITIES: THE OSHA DATA BASE 1985-1989 (1990) [hereinafter OSHA DATA
BASE]. Construction risks are the closest general category to conventional remediation risks. See Hoskin
et al., supra note 5, at 1015; VISCUSI, supra note 8, at 12.
Yale Journal on Regulation
industry versus construction trades) and different metrics (e.g., per worker
versus per person-hour). However, construction is dangerous work by any
standard. 3 The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) indicated in its census of
fatal injuries for 1995 that there were 916 fatalities that year, for a combined
rate of 63 fatalities per 100,000 workers in the construction industry.44 BLS
also reported that about one-sixth of all fatal workplace injuries occurred in
construction work.45 While the consideration of fatalities (usually from
cancer) is typical in the regulation of toxic and hazardous substances, this is
an extremely incomplete measure of conventional risks, many of which may
be devastatingly debilitating without being fatal. 6 The Department of Energy
(DOE) has used industry rates of 13 illnesses and injuries per 200,000 hours
of work and 2.5 fatalities per 10,000 workers per year.47 For the clean-up of a
contaminated fly ash dump at its Fernald site, the DOE used Department of
Labor data indicating risks of 3.4 x 10 injuries per person-hour and 5.0 x 10
fatalities per person-hour. 4' At these rates, a lengthy clean-up process would
almost assuredly result in injuries and fatalities.
2. Hazardous Materials
The signature risks of remedying tanks, ponds, and other containments-
staples of Superfund clean-ups-are materials risks. Liquids must be
drained; 49 solids must be collected" (no small task if they are in powder
43. See NIOSH, supra note 42, at 9-10, 14, 19; NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, Tables:
Unintentional Injuries at Work by Industry, U.S., 1996, in ACCIDENT FACTS 1, 1-3 [hereinafter
ACCIDENT FACTS]; OTA, supra note 25, at 3; National Safety Council, Occupational Unintentional
Injury Death Rates, US., 1996 (visited Sept. 22, 1997) <http://www.nsc.org/lrs/statinfo/afp48.htm>; see
also Hoskin et al., supra note 5, at 1013; Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 5, at 26, 32, 36 tbl.l
(showing injuries, fatalities, and injury costs of various industries as a function of output).
44. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, National Census of Fatal Occupational
Injuries, 1995 (last modified Mar. 6, 1998) <http://stats.bls.gov/oshhome.htm> [hereinafter BLS]; see
also Hoskin et al., supra note 5, at 1015 (using a rate of 33 per 100,000 for laborers, but noting that
other estimates are much higher and that some are lower).
45. See BLS, supra note 44. Both BLS and OSHA believe that their data are incomplete and
therefore understate the magnitude of the problem. See id.; OSHA DATA BASE, supra note 42, at 51-54.
46. See Hoskin et al., supra note 5, at 1016; Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 5, at 30, 37
(explaining that non-fatal injuries are "vastly more frequent" than fatal ones).
47. See OFFICE OF ENVTL. MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, RISKS AND THE RISK DEBATE:
SEARCHING FOR COMMON GROUND 50-53 (1995) [hereinafter DOE RISKS]; see also Travis et al., supra
note 25, at 393 (using 2.45 per 10,000). The Travis statistic is approximately half the BLS estimate if
one combines both construction trades and laborers. See BLS, supra note 44. We cannot account for this
discrepancy.
48. See FERNALD FIELD OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FEASIBILITY STUDY REPORT FOR
OPERABLE UNIT 2, at C-6-1 (1995) [hereinafter FERNALD OU2 FS]; FERNALD FIELD OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T
OF ENERGY, RISK ASSESSMENT WORK PLAN ADDENDUM (OPERABLE UNIT 2) 239 (1992) [hereinafter
RAWPA].
49. See, e.g., Laskin/Poplar Oil, Jefferson, Ohio, EPA ID OHD061722211 (June 29, 1989),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD.
Vol. 15:269, 1998
Short Changing Short-Term Risk
form); and gases must be contained51 for subsequent treatment52 (e.g.,
neutralization), destruction53  (e.g., incineration), or disposal54  (e.g.,
landfilling). Each of these activities presents dangers which correspond to the
characteristics of hazardous waste (e.g., ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity,
toxicity, infectiousness, and radioactivity 5). The actual handlers are at greatest
risk.56 For example, the DOE's draft environmental impact statement for the
remediation of high-level tank wastes calculated both the conventional risks of
construction activities and the radiological exposure risks of working in close
proximity to radioactive sources.57 Ionizing radiation can cause everything
from bums to debilitating injury and death. Workers are informed of possible
risks and are closely monitored. Yet despite these warnings, the DOE
estimated that there would be up to four latent cancer fatalities from
radiological exposure. 8
The inter-agency guidelines identify several other types of materials
risks.59 The chemical hazards at a site are varied and potentially severe. Sites
may contain hundreds of different chemicals in gaseous, liquid, or solid form,
all of which must be handled with great care.6° Exposure can occur in several
50. See, e.g., Midstate Disposal Landfill, Cleveland Township, Wis., EPA ID WID980823082
(Sept. 30, 1988), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (requiring soil/clay caps, sludge stabilization,
and alternate water supply).
51. See, e.g., Cardington Rd. Landfill, Dayton, Ohio, EPA ID OHD93895787 (Sept. 27, 1993),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (requiring active landfill gas collection and treatment, low
permeability cap, and landfill closure actions).
52. See, e.g., Reilly Tar & Chem., Indianapolis, Ind., EPA ID IND1000289722 (Sept. 30, 1993),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (requiring excavation of soil and treatment by thermal desorption;
disposal of condensate from treatment; treatment of sludge by in situ solidification; placement of soil
cover over landfill; and area monitoring).
53. See, e.g., Cross Bros. Pail Recycling, Pembroke Township, Ill., EPA ID ILD980792303
(Sept. 28, 1989), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (requiring excavation of PCB soil and
incineration, installation of on-site groundwater treatment facility, installation of vegetative cover,
fencing, and deed restrictions).
54. See, e.g., Bofors Nobel Inc., Muskegon, Mich., EPA ID MID006030373 (Sept. 17, 1990),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (requiring excavation and treatment of highly contaminated
sludge via on-site thermal treatment, disposal of less contaminated sludge in on-site RCRA landfill, and
upgrading of existing groundwater pumping and treatment).
55. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.21-.24 (1997) (listing characteristics of RCRA hazardous waste).
56. Neighbors, too, may be at risk, as alleged in a recent lawsuit concerning the removal of
buried vats of coal tar. See Tara Burghart, Families Allege Coal Tar Cleanup Caused Children's
Cancer, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1997, at A4. As in that case, however, the routes and levels of neighbors'
exposure are less direct and certain. See also Michael B. Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous
Waste Regulation: Are Justice, Efficiency, and Democracy Reconcilable?, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 706, 740
n. 177 (1998) (book review) (collecting examples of local citizens opposing proposed remedies).
57. See RICHLAND OPERATIONS OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT FOR THE TANK WASTE REMEDIATION SYSTEM at S-22 to S-23, S-34 to S-35 (1996)
[hereinafter HANFORD DEIS].
58. See id. at S-34 to S-35.
59. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY GUIDANCE, supra note 25, at 2-1 to 2-3.
60. See Thomas C. Marshall et al., A Risk Assessment of a Former Pesticide Production Facility,
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different ways-routes of entry include inhalation, direct contact, ingestion,
and injection-and this compounds the difficulty of effectively protecting
workers. Moreover, chemical and other toxic materials pose risks both from
acute, high-dose and chronic, low-dose exposures. Hazardous materials also
may be the sources of explosion and fire from chemical reactions, ignition of
explosive or flammable chemicals, ignition of materials due to oxygen
enrichment, agitation of sensitive compounds, and the sudden release of
materials under pressure.
The decontamination and demolition of structures also requires the
handling of hazardous materials. The hazards to asbestos and lead removal
workers are the now-familiar basis of the allegation that the statistical risks to
the workers are substantially higher than the baseline risks to the occupants of
the buildings being remediated.61 Whether or not this means that asbestos and
lead removal requirements are misguided, there can be no question that the
workers are exposed to vastly greater quantities of the contaminants in the
course of these kinds of clean-up activities than the occupants are ever likely
61to be in the course of their daily activities.
The inter-agency guidelines note that explosions and fires not only cause
immediate hazards to on-site workers but also may result in the transport of
toxic chemicals into surrounding communities. 63 Exposure to these chemicals
creates a risk of chronic, long-latency illness. Other remediation activities use
transportation routes through surrounding communities. The DOE's Fernald
site evaluated the effects of excavating and placing in an engineered facility
many tons of uranium-contaminated fly ash from the facility's power plant. It
estimated a risk to the neighboring community of 2.0 x 10-6 fatalities from
airborne particulates (dust) produced during the excavation process. 64
3. Handling Contaminated Media
The management of contaminated media such as soil, sediments, surface
water, and groundwater is also typical of Superfund sites. Widespread soil or
sediment contamination, as opposed to concentrated "hot spots," results from
in THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH HAZARDS 461, 468-69, 474-76,
478-79 (Dermis J. Paustenbach ed., 1989) (listing chemicals present in the soil and groundwater).
61. See BREYER, supra note 8, at 12-13; Cross, supra note 5, at 898-99.
62. While workers are exposed for a shorter period of time at any given location, asbestos or lead
removal specialists spend every workday with the toxic material.
63. See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY GUIDANCE, supra note 25, at 2-2.
64. See FERNALD OU2 FS, supra note 48, at § 5.4.2.5; see also Susan M. Brett et al., Assessment
of the Public Health Risks Associated with the Proposed Excavation of a Hazardous Waste Site, in THE
RISK ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH HAZARDS 427, 447 (Dennis J. Paustenbach
ed., 1989) (finding that the inhalation of vapors generated by excavation activities at a hazardous waste
site posed a cancer risk of 3 x 10-5 to local residents).
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the deposition of contaminants from air or water into solid media. Thus, large
volumes of soil or sediment must be excavated with heavy equipment65 and
isolated somewhere, either temporarily or permanently.66 Contaminated
surface water must be collected,67 and groundwater must be pumped up.68 One
of the more difficult technical problems at Superfund sites is the removal of
contaminated sediments under rivers, harbors, and other bodies of water,
which sediments are not only hazards in themselves but continue to
recontaminate the superjacent waters.69
Putting aside situations in which urgent action must be taken to address an
imminent risk,7" the typical Superfund site has reached a sort of stability that
is necessarily disturbed by the handling of waste or contaminated media.
Removing radiologically contaminated lake sediments, for example, exposes
remediation workers to radiation that would otherwise be largely isolated.7'
Likewise, disturbing and exposing chemically contaminated soil can result in
abnormally high airborne exposures to workers from the inhalation of
volatilized or particulate matter. Nevertheless, contaminated media present a
relatively low materials risk for workers because the concentration of the
hazardous constituents of these media is comparatively light. The total volume
of material is often correspondingly high, however, which means that the risks
of conventional injuries associated with excavation and the use of heavy
equipment are substantial.72 The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported 167
65. See, e.g., Springfield Township Dump, Springfield Township, Mich., EPA ID
MID980499966 (Sept. 29, 1990), available in WL Database EDR-ROD (requiring excavation and
thermal destruction of soil; solidification of incinerator ash; solidification of metal-contaminated soil;
redeposition of soil and ash on-site; in situ vacuum extraction system; and groundwater extraction and
treatment by a carbon absorption unit).
66. See Mar et al., supra note 5, at 130-31 (describing the clean-up of arsenic contamination from
the ASARCO smelter in Ruston, Washington).
67. See, e.g., Waste Inc. Landfill, Michigan City, Ind., EPA ID IND980504005 (Aug. 18, 1994),
available in WL Database EDR-ROD (requiring Subtitle D cap and groundwater extraction wells).
68. See, e.g., New Brighton/Arden Hills, Arden Hills, Minn., EPA ID MN7213920908 (Sept. 30,
1993), available in WL Database EDR-ROD (requiring pumping and treating groundwater in a granular
activated carbon facility, an alternative water supply, and monitoring).
69. See, e.g., Moss-American Kerr-McGee Oil Co., Milwaukee, Wis., EPA ID WID039052626
(Sept. 27, 1990), available in WL Database EDR-ROD (requiring removal and treatment of soil; river
rerouting; treatment of groundwater; and on-site disposal of residue from treatment of soil).
70. CERCLA provides specially for such situations; they are addressed by "removal" or
abatement actions. CERCLA § 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1994). Removal and abatement actions
are governed by different legal criteria than long-term "remedial actions," § 101(24), and they are
accordingly outside of the scope of this Article.
71. See STEPHEN DYCUS, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 112-13 (1996) (suggesting
that it might prove better not to clean up the cesium-137 contaminated sediments found in a lake at the
DOE Savannah River site).
72. For example, conventional risks far exceed materials risks for low-level radioactive and
mixed waste, but not for high-level radioactive and transuranic waste. Compare WMPEIS, supra note
25, at 46, 57 (LLW and MLW), with id. at 67, 75 (HLW and TRU).
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fatalities in 1995 among heavy moving equipment operators, or 15 per
100,000 workers.73
The remediation of contaminated media poses hazards to the surrounding
community as well. The disturbance of contaminated soil or sediment within a
clean-up site can result in either resuspension of contamination in the air or
erosion of exposed contamination, both of which transport the material
beyond site boundaries.74 This was the source of the public health hazard from
the Fernald fly ash pile.75 A published risk assessment of the excavation of
hazardous waste lagoons adjacent to a residential area reported an excess
carcinogen risk of 3 x 10"', as well as a risk of several non-cancer illnesses.76
In another clean-up, residents complained that a proposed groundwater
remedy for contamination of an aquifer would draw the chemical of concern
from the contaminated shallow aquifer to the clean deeper one.
77
The public health concern can also involve contamination within the
community itself.78 At the Montclair/West Orange radium site in New Jersey,
residents were temporarily relocated while their yards were dug up to remove
contaminated soil. Residents who were not relocated were concerned about
noise and dust from the heavy machinery. At the California Gulch Superfund
site in Leadville, Colorado-an old mining town with severe mining waste
problems and high lead levels in the soil-one of the operable units
encompasses the residential areas that are contaminated with lead. Remedies
for the contaminated soil included sediment drainage controls, revegetation,
capping, reshaping, and removal. Residents of Leadville strongly opposed
clean-up, claiming that they were not suffering any adverse effects from lead
and therefore did not want to be subject to the risks and inconveniences of
having their yards excavated. The EPA responded to these complaints by
abandoning some aspects of the clean-up and changing the lead standard by
which they determine if clean-up is necessary for a particular piece of
property.79
73. See BLS, supra note 44.
74. See Dycus, supra note 71, at 112; Cross, supra note 5, at 902; Richard L. Stroup, Superfund:
The Shortcut That Failed, in BREAKING THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY GRIDLOCK 115, 128 (Terry L.
Anderson ed., 1997) (describing lead clean-ups in Triumph, Idaho and Aspen, Colorado).
75. See FERNALD OU2 FS, supra note 46, at § 5.4.2.5.
76. See Brett et al., supra note 64, at 447.
77. See United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc., 31 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 1994). The
court's holding that such a challenge could be maintained was overruled by Clinton County Comm 'rs v.
EPA, 116 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
78. This was the case in the area around the ASARCO smelter described in Mar et al., supra note
5, at 130-31.
79. See Jonma Leigh Stack, CERCLA: Applied to California Gulch Superfund Site (1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).
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The harm to the natural environment from excavating large volumes of
soil and sediment is even more pronounced. Large areas of land can be
contaminated by airborne deposition of hazardous materials, such as
particulate matter emitted by a smokestack."0 It turned out, for example, that
the most effective technique for handling the contamination of Belarussian
forests after the Chernobyl accident was "organic layer removal," which
means stripping out all of the organic material on the ground. However, this
technique results in the resuspension of radiological contaminants and large
volumes of waste material."' At the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
the accumulation of wind-blown dust on plants affected birds and animals that
fed on the plants.82 Also, without subsequent remediation of the remediation,
so to speak, a moonscape results. For instance, at the Fernald site, soil cleanup
will involve scraping away at least several hundred acres of the soil surface,
including wetlands.8 3 The resulting surface will be unusable unless new top
soil is brought in (thus denuding some other location), and any flora or fauna
residing in the soil during remediation will be destroyed. Wetland habitats are
destroyed by such excavation activities 4 as well as by the dredging of
contaminated sediments.8" A DOE report noted that many of its sites have
become habitats for threatened and endangered species and that habitat
destruction or disruption from similar remediation activities would place such
species at risk. 6 More prosaic activities can be equally destructive. The clean-
up of Prince William Sound after the Exxon Valdez oil spill 7 resulted in the
destruction of many shoreline organisms from both the heated water used to
wash the beaches and from the trampling feet of an army of remediation
workers.88
The measurement of ecological effects is difficult, and balancing them
with health effects is even more so. 9 There are no common metrics for
80. See Mar et al., supra note 5, at 130 (describing the ASARCO smelter).
81. See Igor Linkov et al., Remedial Policies in Radiologically-Contaminated Forests:
Environmental Consequences and Risk Assessment, 17 RISK ANALYSIS 67, 69 (1997). Linkov and his
colleagues found that forests were a major source of human radiation exposure. See id. at 67.
82. See CERE, supra note 25, at 3-19.
83. Seeid.atl-19.
84. See id. at 4-29.
85. See id. at 6-40; see also Glenn W. Suter II et al., An Approach for Balancing Health and
Ecological Risks at Hazardous Waste Sites, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 221, 222 (1995).
86. See CERE, supra note 25, at 4-3.
87. Since petroleum is excluded from CERCLA, this clean-up was undertaken under the auspices
of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994), and the oil spill provisions of the National
Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.300-.335 (1997).
88. See Cross, supra note 5, at 905-06.
89. See Suter et al., supra note 85. The Hanford DEIS measured ecological harm by the number
of acres disturbed. See HANFORD DEIS, supra note 57, at S-24. This is a logical metric, but it obviously
fails to reflect the intensity of the disturbance.
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ecological harm and human health, so one must rely on the common-sense
inference that, without vigorous restoration efforts, the kind of excavation
activities involved in remediating contaminated media is likely to devastate
the natural environment. For contamination in industrial areas, the net effect
could be minimal, but for contamination in rural or greenspace areas, this
should be a major concern.
4. Waste Treatment
As we shall see in Part II, CERCLA contains a preference for "treatment
which permanently and significantly reduces the volume, toxicity, or
mobility" of the hazardous substances found at Superfund sites.9" Therefore,
much of the hazardous material found at these sites is destined for some form
of treatment to neutralize it,9 to solidify it,92 to burn it,93 to reduce its
volume,94 to wash it,95 to separate its components, 96 or to dilute it.97 Treatment
residues and untreatable materials are typically disposed of in hazardous waste
landfills. 9 Treatment and disposal can occur either on the site itself 9 or
elsewhere,' often at a substantial distance.
90. CERCLA § 121(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1) (1994).
91. See, e.g., MIDCO I Site, Gary, Ind., EPA ID IND980615421 (June 30, 1989), available in
WL, Database EDR-ROD (requiring on-site treatment of contaminated soil by a combination of vapor
extraction and solidification/stabilization followed by on-site deposition of the solidified material).
92. See, e.g., Reilly Tar & Chemical, Indianapolis, Ind., EPA ID IND1000289722 (Sept. 30,
1993), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD.
93. See, e.g., LaSalle Elec. Utils., LaSalle, Ill., EPA ID ILD980794333 (Mar. 30, 1988),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (requiring excavation and on-site incineration of affected soil and
sediment; and collection and on-site treatment of groundwater by phase separation, filtration, and air
stripping).
94. See, e.g., Hunts Disposal, Caledonia, Wis., EPA ID WID980511919 (Sept. 29, 1990),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (requiring fencing, consolidation of contaminated soil,
construction of cap and slurry wall, monitoring, and institutional controls).
95. See, e.g., Tri-State Plating, Columbus, Ind., EPA ID IND006038764 (Mar. 30, 1990),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (requiring monitoring of groundwater and institutional controls).
96. See, e.g., Adams Plating, Lansing, Mich., EPA ID MID006522791 (Sept. 29, 1993),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (requiring excavation and off-site disposal of contaminated soil;
collection and treatment of water; replacement of excavated soil; land use restrictions; and groundwater
monitoring).
97. See, e.g., Dakhue Sanitary Landfill, Hampton, Minn., EPA ID MND981191570 (June 30,
1993), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (requiring institutional controls and groundwater
monitoring).
98. See, e.g., Bofors Nobel Inc., Muskegon, Mich., EPA ID MID006030373 (Sept. 17, 1990),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (requiring excavation and treatment of highly contaminated
sludge via on-site thermal treatment, disposal of less contaminated sludge in on-site RCRA landfill, and
upgrading of existing groundwater pumping and treatment).
99. See, e.g., MIDCO I Site, Gary, Ind., EPA ID IND980615421 (June 30, 1989), available in
WL, Database EDR-ROD (requiring on-site treatment of contaminated soil by a combination of vapor
extraction and solidification/stabilization followed by on-site deposition of the solidified material).
100. See, e.g., Republic Steel Quarry, Elyria, Ohio, EPA ID OHD980903447 (Sept. 30, 1988),
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The draft environmental impact statement (EIS) for the Tank Waste
Remediation System at the DOE's Hanford site exemplifies the hazards for
remediation workers from the disposal and management of radioactive,
hazardous, and mixed wastes.'' Both conventional occupational accidents and
materials exposures during operations and waste transportation are implicated.
Based on a "labor year" analysis, the DOE determined that the number of
occupational fatalities would range between one and three over the course of
the project. Community risk derives from radiological and chemical accidents,
and from transportation accidents involving deliveries of materials and
supplies to the site. Exposures could occur through accidents such as spray
release during the transfer of waste in the cross-site transfer line, a breakdown
of the air filtration system, or transportation accidents during the off-site
shipment of high-level waste. Taking into account the probability of
occurrence, the DOE concluded that up to three deaths would occur from
radiological and chemical accidents. Finally, the remediation would have
adverse effects on the surrounding shrub-steppe habitat, such as displacing
sensitive wildlife. The EIS estimated that up to 250 acres of habitat would be
destroyed by new remediation facilities and by earth-moving activities.'
Similarly, at the Oak Ridge facility, habitat destruction for small mammals
was caused by capping waste sites, which required clearing trees and
removing topsoil.'0 3
By far the most common waste treatment of concern is incineration,
which is frequently selected because it promises to eliminate the hazardous
substances almost entirely. Nearby residents often oppose incineration
because they fear adverse health effects caused by combustion products and
the dispersion of incompletely consumed chemicals through the incinerator's
exhaust."° CERCLA broadly precludes judicial review of the EPA's remedy
selection until the EPA actually imposes costs on a private party, so review
usually occurs only after the remedy has been implemented. "' Since this
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (requiring removal and off-site disposal of contaminated soil).
101. See HANFORD DEIS, supra note 57, at S-I, S-22 to S-24. The waste includes 56 million
gallons of waste stored or to be stored in underground storage tanks at the site. See id. Additionally,
cesium and strontium contained in 1930 capsules is in need of disposal. See id.
102. The long-term management and minimal retrieval alternatives would disturb between 25
and 100 acres. See id. at S-24. The more extensive retrieval alternatives would disturb between 180 and
250 acres. See id.
103. See CERE, supra note 25, at 4-28.
104. See, e.g., GAO, supra note 38, at 14, 57 (reporting on the Texarkana Wood Preserving
Company site, Texarkana, Texas, and the Brio Refining, Inc. site, Harris County, Texas). When the
waste being incinerated is nerve gas, the danger from incomplete destruction is severe. See DYCus,
supra note 71, at 66-67.
105. See CERCLA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (1994). See generally Michael P. Healy, The
Effectiveness and Fairness of Superfund's Judicial Review Preclusion Provision, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
271, 301-07, 313-14 (1995-1996) [hereinafter Effectiveness and Fairness]; Michael P. Healy, Judicial
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provision has been interpreted broadly, °6  relatively few preemptive
challenges are even attempted. What nevertheless seems to encourage such
attempts, notwithstanding the unlikelihood of prevailing, is the fear of
incineration of dioxins, PCBs, and other hazardous materials in contaminated
soil.'0 7 None of the challenges has been successful, but it is clear that the risks
of incineration are of serious importance to affected communities.
5. Transportation
The risks of transportation associated with remediation activities are the
most substantial remediation risks, both because there is a great deal of
movement of waste and other materials in and out of Superfund sites and
because transportation is statistically quite hazardous.' ° 8" Transportation risks
are also the best defined remediation risks because transportation risks are
generally well-documented. The paradigm case is the transportation of
contaminated soil for distant treatment or disposal. As we have seen, the soil
contains the contaminants in relatively low concentrations, but the overall
volume is very high, requiring many truck- or train-miles to move it. A study
of the transportation risks of removing arsenic-contaminated soil from
residential areas around a smelter found that the number of deaths and injuries
from accidents was comparable to the expected incidence of cancer from the
arsenic." Similarly, transportation accidents are the only substantial risks to
Review and CERCLA Response Actions: Interpretive Strategies in the Face of Plain Meaning, 17 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 36-43 (1993) [hereinafter Judicial Review].
106. See, e.g., Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(overruling a prior case permitting preemptive challenges in special circumstances), cert. denied sub
nom. Arrest the Incinerator Remediation Inc. v. EPA, 118 S.Ct. 687 (1998).
107. See Clinton County, 116 F.3d at 1021; Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution
Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1993); Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1095-96 (7th Cir.
1990); Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557-58 (lth Cir. 1989). Reviewing these cases, Healy
identifies two kinds of health-based claims: (i) The clean-up will be inadequate under CERCLA or an
ARAR, and (ii) the clean-up itself will be too dangerous. See Effectiveness and Fairness, supra note
105, at 271-72. Healy is critical of the absolute preclusion of health-based claims and certainly of those
claims alleging the danger of the clean-up, noting that the site can be stabilized while the dangers or
inadequacy of the remediation is litigated. See id. at 301-07, 313-14, 341-44; Judicial Review, supra
note 105, at 36-43, 48-51.
The Times Beach saga has produced its own series of cases challenging the incineration remedy
for the dioxin-contaminated dirt in that town. See Missouri v. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 104
F.3d 159 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bliss, 133 F.R.D. 559 (E.D. Mo. 1990); United States v. Bliss,
132 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Mo. 1990). None of the challenges was successful.
108. See, e.g., Adams Plating, Lansing, Mich., EDR ID 1000303229 (Sept. 29, 1993), available
in WL Database EDR-ROD (requiring excavation and off-site disposal of contaminated soil; collection
and treatment of water; replacement of excavated soil; land use restrictions; and groundwater
monitoring).
109. See Mar et al., supra note 5, at 132. Mar and his colleagues estimated that at the highest
levels of transportation (necessitated by the lowest levels of residual risk), one would expect 0.67
fatalities and 24.19 injuries (3.62 of them disabling) from truck traffic, as compared to the EPA's
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the general public predicted in association with the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
for defense radioactive waste. The public radiation risk is swamped by both
worker and transportation accident risk." Acting on the basis of
transportation risk information, a citizens group at the Fernald facility
formally recommended to the DOE that it utilize on-site waste disposal in
order to avoid additional shipments from Ohio to Utah or Nevada."'
Like the other remediation activities, transportation risk has both
materials and conventional aspects." 2 The materials risks, however, are
swamped by the conventional, mechanical risks of accidents, which have
nothing to do with the nature of the material being transported, but rather
result from the frequency of rail and truck accidents., 3 Thus, the Hanford
DEIS found that for every scenario requiring waste transportation, the
expected fatalities from transportation accidents significantly exceeded those
expected from radiation exposure during transportation.' Railroad accident
statistics also reveal a large differential between accidental fatalities and
fatalities from exposure to hazardous materials during transportation." 5
The most visible transportation concern is the movement of hazardous
substances or contaminated media from the clean-up site to another location
for treatment or disposal. The prospect of such materials rolling though towns
and cities, on road or rail, is a matter of real concern to those who inhabit the
transportation corridors and the immediate vicinity of the site. At the Ewan
Property Dump in New Jersey, for example, residents were concerned about
the impact of a fleet of trucks on rural traffic and the safety of children who
lived close to the site access road." 6 Transportation is a two-way street,
estimate of 2 arsenic-related skin cancers (not necessarily fatalities) for every 6000 persons exposed over
a lifetime. See id. at 133. Mar also cited a study sponsored by another smelter operator, which study
claimed that transportation risks "dwarqed]" the baseline cancer risk. Id.
110. CARLSBAD AREA OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT
DISPOSAL PHASE: FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, at S-71, S-76 to S-79
(1997).
111. See FERNALD CITIZENS TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS ON REMEDIATION LEVELS,
WASTE DISPOSITION, PRIORITIES, AND FUTURE USE 39 (1995). The DOE had estimated between 7 and II
transportation-related deaths and between 37 and 115 injuries. See id. at 18 app. E.
112. See NEVADA RISK ASSESSMENT/MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, PRELIMINARY RISK ASSESSMENT
OF DOE SITES IN NEVADA 72 (1996) [hereinafter NRAMP] (identifying routine radiation and chemical
releases, exhaust fumes, accidental exposures, and accidents as the types of transportation risk).
113. See Travis, supra note 25, at 401.
114. HANFORD DEIS, supra note 57, at S-22 to S-23, S-34.
115. The Association of American Railroads reported that there was only one hazardous
materials fatality from rail traffic and 118 from truck traffic between 1985 and 1996. See On Track?,
ENV'T, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 24. In 1995 alone, there were 918 fatal motor vehicle operator accidents, or
about 24 per 100,000 workers.
116. GAO, supra note 38, at 29. Similarly, centralized management of chemical weapons and
nuclear waste is often opposed on the grounds of transportation risks. See DYCUS, supra note 71, at 66-
67.
Yale Journal on Regulation
however. Superfund sites also require inbound transportation of construction
materials, treatment chemicals, and other equipment for building and
operating, for example, treatment facilities and disposal cells, or for restoring
the grade where soil and sediment have been removed. While such materials
are naturally less hazardous than the outbound traffic, in terms of conventional
risks such as accidents it makes no real difference that these materials are
"clean."
Conventional risks have two potential receptors, namely transportation
workers and the general public, with the latter generally exposed to similar or
greater risks than the former." 7 Transportation incidents are, by a factor of
two, the largest cause of worker fatalities (including fatalities at construction
sites)."8 Moreover, transportation literally delivers conventional risk to the
public, and in far greater magnitude than any of the materials risks from
contaminated media or waste treatment and disposal.' It is common for
Superfund sites to require the transportation of waste materials over long
distances, 20 which should not be surprising given the difficulty of siting
hazardous waste disposal facilities.' 2' The DOE's study of transuranic waste
117. See CARLSBAD AREA OFFICE, supra note 110, at S-71.
118. There were about 2500 such fatalities in 1995. Bizarrely, homicides are the next most
frequent cause of death, followed closely by being struck by or caught in between objects. See BLS,
supra note 44; see also Hoskin et al., supra note 5, at 1015.
The Femald feasibility study figures, drawn from various federal sources and normalized by the
authors into a single unit, give some sense of relative accident rates.
SOURCE INJURIES ] FATALITIES
Construction 3400 x 10.' / person-hour 50 x 10- / person-hour
Truck--driver 4.1 x 10.8 / mile 0.21 x 10.' / mile
Truck-public 12 x 10. / mile 1.3 x 100 / mile
Rail-employee 460 x 10 8 / mile 4.6 x 10-' / mile
Rail-public 680 x 10. / mile 180 x 10- / mile
See FERNALD OU2 FS, supra note 48, at C-6-13 to C-6-14.
This table measures risk in very small increments as transportation can entail thousands and
thousands of cumulative miles, just as a given site can require thousands and thousands of person-hours
of construction work. See Hoskin et al., supra note 5, at 1013 (estimating 909,447 person-hours of work
at a site); Gerrard & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 3 (agreeing with an OTA estimate of 800/500). It should
be noted, however, that rail is usually the overall safer transportation option because its large capacity
means far fewer trains must be used and hence far fewer miles must be traveled.
119. See NRAMP, supra note 112, at 235 ("[T]ransportation is the dominant source of public
risk and... treatment and disposal are dominant for worker risks.").
120. See Cohen et al., supra note 4, at 420; Hoskin et al., supra note 5, at 1014; Gerrard &
Goldberg, supra note 4, at 3.
121. See generally GERRARD, supra note 3 (discussing the difficulty of siting hazardous waste
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disposal scenarios that require transportation to a centralized location shows
that transportation risk dominates the overall risk profile. 22 For low-level
waste, centralized disposal options ranged from 35 to 38 expected truck
accident deaths while regional options ranged from 1 to 10-all of which are
far higher than predicted occupational fatalities." 3 Moreover, the DOE
estimated that the risk of fatalities from truck accidents was slightly lower per
mile than the risk of death from the vehicles' exhaust. 124
6. Federal Facilities
Federal facilities provide a particularly dramatic way to explore
remediation risks. The slighting of remediation risks, while common at
Superfund sites where the clean-up period is relatively brief, is simply not
possible for the clean-up of environmentally contaminated military facilities,
especially the former nuclear weapons production facilities of the DOE. The
types of waste and contamination are so exotically hazardous; the scale of the
problems is so vast; and the cost is so extraordinary that the DOE's
remediation phase demands attention to a degree that private sites do not. 125 In
this sense, federal facilities are the apotheosis of remediation risk, exhibiting
virtually all of the elements associated with ordinary sites and expanding them
to new dimensions.
Several of the materials at issue-unlike hazardous materials such as
asbestos, dioxin-contaminated waste, and PCB-contaminated waste-pose a
real risk of immediate, catastrophic effects. 26 For example, unexploded
ordnance and chemical weapons must be handled with great caution. Less
dangerous materials, but equally capable of imposing immediate harm,
include the extremely radioactive wastes from plutonium extraction at the
DOE's Hanford and Savannah River sites and the toxic constituents of
defoliant production at the Defense Department's Rocky Mountain Arsenal.
One example of these hazards is the radium-bearing wastes at the DOE's
Femald facility in southwestern Ohio. Extraordinary precautions must be
taken even in the basic process of removing the wastes from their storage silos
both to shield workers from intense direct radiation and to prevent the release
of large quantities of radon gas generated by the radioactive decay of
disposal facilities).
122. See CARLSBAD AREA OFFICE, supra note 110, at S-44 (estimating five fatalities in
association with the preferred alternative, which involved shipping to a central facility).
123. See WMPEIS, supra note 25, at 57.
124. See id. app. at E-1 17 (finding that accident risk was 1.53 x 108'/mile, while exhaust (SO 2
and particulates) risk was 1.6 x 10-7/mile).
125. For an excellent and thorough overview of the occupational hazards posed by the
remediation of DOE facilities, see OTA, supra note 25.
126. See DYCUS, supra note 71, at 66-67, 99-100.
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radium.' The retrieval of all of the unexploded ordnance from the Jefferson
Proving Ground in Indiana will also entail the ecologically disastrous
"stripmining" of the 51,700-acre site. 28 Mismanagement of any of the
foregoing materials could have lethal effects.
Military waste poses unusually serious dangers. A highly-charged debate
continues over the best way to neutralize and destroy chemical weapons. The
Army's method of choice, incineration, could conceivably release the
unconsumed agents into the air, as well as create dioxins and other
incineration by-products. Radioactive wastes, whose millenia-long half-lives
mean that they will remain dangerous far into the future, raise the spectre of
exposing future generations to high levels of radiation through the breakdown
of repositories or inadvertent intrusions into them. The life cycle of
plutonium, used primarily as the fuel for nuclear weapons, exemplifies the
problem. Plutonium is radioactive and extremely toxic, especially when
inhaled. 29 Its production entails the creation of large quantities of -highly
radioactive liquid waste. 130 Plutonium itself oxidizes rapidly into an extremely
fine powder that is easily inhaled. Moreover, in some circumstances it will
burn spontaneously when exposed to the air.' 3' Non-nuclear explosions of the
components of weapons have left the floor of an entire Nevada valley littered
with plutonium,'32 and ventilation systems at the Rocky Flats plant near
Denver are coated with plutonium dust. Furthermore, plutonium must be
carefully safeguarded to prevent its use in a terrorist bomb, the health and
environmental effects of which would be unspeakable.1
3
Even for the more conventional risks that federal facilities present, the
number of those facilities and the expected duration of the remediation
projects tend to concentrate the mind on remediation risk. Contaminated sites
can be found at about 1722 Department of Defense installations; 134 and the
DOE has over 10,000 separate contaminated locations at 137 facilities. 135
127. See FERNALD AREA OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FEASIBILITY STUDY REPORT FOR
OPERABLE UNIT 4 (1995).
128. DyCus, supra note 71, at 99-100; see Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Project Fact
Sheet (visited June 16, 1998) <http://www.hnd.usace.army.mil/oew/oefact.sht/factshts/jeffersn.html>.
129. See JOHN HARTE ET AL., ToxICS A TO Z 386-88 (1991).
130. See OFFICE OF ENVTL. MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, LINKING LEGACIES: CONNECTING
THE COLD WAR NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION PROCESSES TO THEIR ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSEQUENCES 24-25, 171-81 (1997).
131. See CERE, supra note 25, at 4-3.
132. NRAMP, supra note 112, at 131-34, 144. The area is now aptly named "Plutonium Valley."
133. See generally JONATHAN SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH (1982) (describing the effects of
nuclear explosions).
134. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CLEANING UP DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS: ISSUES AND
OPTIONS 7 (1995). The problems include both conventional contaminants, such as petroleum and
industrial solvents, and unconventional items such as unexploded ordnance. See id. at 10-11.
135. See OFFICE OF ENVTL. MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE 1996 BASELINE
Vol. 15:269, 1998
Short Changing Short-Term Risk
Despite an aggressive plan to accelerate the pace of clean-up, the DOE's
remediation activities will not be entirely complete for decades, at a cost of up
to $265 billion. 3 6 Over the course of decades and with hundreds of thousands
of person-years of work involved,'37 fatalities, serious injuries to workers, and
harm to the public and environment are likely to occur (as they already have).
In sum, the types and scale of hazards at defense facilities make cleaning
them up a unique and perilous undertaking. It is in this context that the
problem of remediation risk is most dramatically illustrated, but the
underlying problem is ubiquitous. The remediation risks of federal facilities
are in many ways simply the extreme case of a problem that can be found
throughout the Superfund program. For the purposes of this study, federal
facilities are also important because their remediation risks, especially as they
relate to workers, have not been ignored, and precisely because they are so
long-lived and exotic. Studies of DOE facilities in particular, and regulatory
submissions by the DOE for its facilities, have considered the problem in
detail and thus provide an invaluable source of data on the components and
scale of remediation risks.'38 Moreover, since one of the DOE's major clean-
up operations, the Fernald Environmental Management Project, is in EPA
Region V (the source of the RODs in this study), its regulatory consideration
of short-term risk provides a control against which less thorough consideration
of remediation risk can be evaluated.1
39
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT REPORT 3-13 (1996). Several smaller sites have subsequently been
transferred to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
136. See id. at 4-1 (1996). The terms "complete" and "clean-up" are somewhat euphemistic in
this context. Current plans aspire to finish the bulk of the clean-up in ten years and at a substantially
lower life-cycle cost of $117 billion, but a number of significant projects, such as the tanks at Hanford,
will take longer. Residual groundwater treatment and environmental monitoring will continue long after
the completion of even those projects. See OFFICE OF ENVTL. MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
ACCELERATING CLEANUP: Focus ON 2006, at 4-7 to 4-12 (1997) [hereinafter ACCELERATING CLEANUP].
Moreover, an area that is "clean" should not necessarily be released to the public; for the many sites at
which some contamination remains (either in situ or in a disposal facility), long-term stewardship
activities must continue indefinitely. See id at 1-4 to 1-5; OFFICE OF ENVTL. MGMT., supra note 135, at
3-8 to 3-18, 6-1 to 6-13.
137. The DOE employs over 130,000 persons. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, COMPLEX
CLEANUP: THE ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION 15 (1991); Carmen E.
MacDougall, Letters to the Editor: We're Not Going Anywhere but Forward, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23,
1996, at A23. MacDougall is a senior DOE official. See MacDougall, supra, at A23.
138. See DOE RISKS, supra note 47, at 51-52; CERE, supra note 25, at 3-8 to 3-9; Travis et al.,
supra note 25, at 396-400.
139. The Femald RODs post-date our sample and therefore are not included in our study. In the
interests of full disclosure, it should be noted that one of us (Applegate) has been heavily involved in the
remedy selection at Femald, as chair of the Femald Citizens Task Force, the citizens' advisory board of
that site.
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7. Summary
Our review of remediation risks supports the two points made at the
beginning of this discussion. First, remediation risks are significant in the
sense that they warrant serious attention in the EPA's remedy selection
decisions. Translating the known risk levels from person-hours and miles to
actual expected deaths, one would multiply the rates by several orders of
magnitude, resulting in positive numbers of predicted fatalities in many cases,
and certainly in the overall Superfund program. The DOE's overall risk
estimates suggest that several fatalities will occur over the course of the clean-
up program, 40 and the Hanford and Nevada site studies both expect several
remediation fatalities from various causes.' Viscusi has estimated a low of
720 and a high of 6000 fatalities over the life of the Superfund program,'42 but
his methodology requires some comment. The figures are derived from a
calculation of the mortality effects of loss of income (the poorer one is, the
higher one's mortality rate), and loss of income is viewed as a function of the
cost of the Superfund program. Similarly, Viscusi and Zeckhauser calculated
remediation risks from general statistics on the risk component of industrial
output.'43 These are, to say the least, indirect measures of remediation risk.
Viscusi may have been driven to use such measures by the lack of good direct
data,'" but his figures should be used with extreme caution.
Second, different remediation activities pose different types of hazards to
different risk receptors.' 45 Therefore, remedy selection decisions inevitably,
though not explicitly, determine how many injuries and fatalities will occur,
what will cause them, and who will be the victims. Moreover, the underlying
decision to take remedial action allocates risk among different time periods,
which also means among different populations. It increases total risk in the
near term to decrease it in the long-term, as Figure 3 indicates."'
140. See DOE RISKS, supra note 47, at 27, 50 (estimating 2.5 construction fatalities per 10,000
workers per year, not including chemical and radiological risks).
141. See HANFORD DEIS, supra note 57, at S-22 to S-23, S-34 to S-35; NRAMP, supra note
112, at 235, 237.
142. See Viscusi, supra note 5, at 12-13.
143. See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 5, at 22-24.
144. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
145. See supra p. 279 tbl. 1.
146. The figure superimposes a graph adapted from CERE, supra note 25, at 3-15, on the time
line used in this Article. The CERE graph relates to plutonium stabilization, but its general trend is
consistent with that of Superfund site risk. The near-term increases in risk are documented in this
Article. The long-term increase of the uncontrolled risk has been documented elsewhere. See Human
Health Risk, supra note 3, at 587 (concluding that a major source of risk at Superfund sites is the
anticipated future use of the site). The flatness of the remedial action line is a result of the remedial
action itself, the main purpose of which is to stabilize the physical situation (and hence the residual risk)
over the long term.
Vol. 15:269, 1998
Short Changing Short-Term Risk
FIGURE 3
Superfund Life Cycle Risk Profile
Total Risk with
Total Risk with Minimal Remedial Action
Controls and No
Remedial Action : "
Uncontrolled Polluted Remediation Foreseeable Long-Term
Past Present Period Future Stewardship
Any regulatory decision, the effect of which is to choose who and how many
people will be injured or killed as a consequence, should report that prediction
and make it an indispensable (though not necessarily determinative) element
of the decisionmaking process.
II. The Legal Framework for Remedy Selection
CERCLA has two distinct parts. The liability provisions identify those
persons responsible for the potentially enormous clean-up costs.'47 The
remedy selection provisions, on the other hand, define the actions that must be
taken to clean up Superfund sites.'4  Remediation risk receives limited
attention in the remedy selection process. Even detailed descriptions of the
remedy selection criteria and process mention it only in passing. 49 While the
remedy selection process establishes the costs allocated by the liability
provisions, it receives considerably less legal attention. This is presumably
due in part to CERCLA's preclusion of judicial review of the remedy
selection process. 5° It is also due to the fact that liability allocation decisions
are the most proximate, and thus most obvious, cause of costs being imposed
147. See, e.g., CERCLA §§ 107, 111, 113, 122(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607, 9611, 9613, 9622(a)
(1994).
148. See, e.g., §§ 104, 105, 121(a).
149. See Lilly Ferris & David Rees, CERCLA Remedy Selection: Abandoning the Quick Fix
Mentality, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 785, 839-44 (1994); Casey Scott Padgett, Selecting Remedies at Superfund
Sites: How Should "Clean " Be Determined?, 18 VT. L. REv. 361, 383-84 (1994).
150. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
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on CERCLA defendants. Moreover, lawyers tend to be more comfortable with
the familiar issues of legal responsibility than with the technical problems of
remediation. The remedy selection provisions of CERCLA are our present
focus, and we shall see that they follow a pattern of focusing on baseline and
target conditions, with the effect of minimizing consideration of the transition
period.
As is typical in federal administration, the applicable legal rules are found
not only in the statute, but also in the regulations and guidance documents.
The regulations in this case are found in the so-called National Contingency
Plan (NCP)-the name reflects CERCLA's ancestry in the oil spill response.
legislationlS"-which sets out the formal and rather elaborate process of
making remedy selection decisions. The process begins with the site
investigation (SI) and preliminary assessment (PA) of places showing the
effects of an environmentally uncontrolled past. If warranted, the site is placed
on the National Priorities List for remedial action. Serious evaluation of the
site's condition and needs is undertaken in the remedial investigation (RI) and
feasibility study (FS), which are usually combined into a single document
called the RI/FS. The consideration and comparison of alternative remedies in
the feasibility study leads to the development of a proposed plan (PP) that,
after public comment and revision, is memorialized in the record of decision
(ROD). The decisionmaker for all practical purposes is the EPA's remedial
project manager (RPM). According to The RPM Primer, the EPA's
introductory description of the job, RPMs are responsible for the overall
management of the clean-up project. They oversee the gathering and analysis
of information, the implementation of interim and final remedies, and the
initial selection of a remedy.'52 Like any bureaucratic decisionmaker, the
manager is subject to both legal and programmatic supervision. Formal
approval of the ROD is made by the Regional Administrator,153 but the
uniqueness and complexity of each situation, as well as the limited time of
supervisory personnel, obviously make intensive oversight impractical.'54
Detailed planning of remediation activities occurs in the remedial
design/remedial action (RD/RA) phase, after which the physical clean-up
151. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1994).
152. See generally OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, THE RPM PRIMER: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO THE ROLE AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SUPERFUND REMEDIAL PROJECT MANAGER (1987) [hereinafter RPM PRIMER].
153. See id at 18-19. The RPM, according to The RPM Primer, makes all of the initial decisions,
including interim actions, remediation targets, writing the PP, and drafting the ROD. Indeed, design
work on the selected remedy begins before the ROD is formally approved. See id. at 4-5, 14-15, 17-19.
154. See Benefits and Costs, supra note 11, at 184 ("[T]he diversity of remedies that have been
selected.., demonstrates that site managers do enjoy some discretion."); see also Fernis & Rees, supra
note 149, at 839-44 (describing the RPMs' discretion as "uncontrolled").
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must begin promptly. The remedy selected in the ROD is designed to achieve
a target condition that meets the residual risk levels specified by CERCLA
and the NCP. Finally, the NCP provides for operation, maintenance, and
eventual completion of the site. The remedy selection process can be mapped
onto the time line:
FIGURE 4
RI/FS Process
Uncontrolled Polluted Remediation Foreseeable Long-Term
Past Present Period Future Stewardship
Baseline Transition Target or
Residual
SI, PA RI/FS, PP ROD, RD/RA Completion Surveillance & Maintenance,
The SI, PA, and RI/FS documents define the polluted present of the site; the
PP, ROD, and RD/RA documents determine what the remediation period will
look like.
Remediation risks come into play only at the feasibility study stage, and
they are incorporated into the remedy selection analysis in the proposed plan
and ROD under the rubric of "short-term effectiveness," as detailed below.
While remediation risks play no part in site identification, they could
conceivably be the basis of a no-action decision in the ROD.
A. The Statutory Language
Remedy selection is directed primarily by section 121 of CERCLA.155 It
divides the issue into two subsections: the selection of a particular remedial
action or actions and the degree of clean-up, defined as the permissible level
of residual risk." 6 The distinction itself is logical enough, but the barrier
between technique and degree often breaks down in practice. Many
technologies have limited capabilities. For example, soil washing can remove
most but not all of the contamination, and in some cases the "clean" fraction
remains a hazardous waste. Conversely, the choice of certain clean-up
parameters, such as solidification or destruction, will effectively mandate a
particular technology to accomplish it. The two subsections have overlapping
provisions. Therefore, it is most realistic to consider choice and degree of
155. CERCLA § 121,42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1994).
156. See § 121(b),(d).
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remedy together as aspects of a single set of factors, priorities, and preferences
for remedy selection.
It is common, even de rigeur, to criticize CERCLA as a badly drafted
statute passed in haste at the end of the Carter presidency.'57 The 1986
Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act (SARA) resolved many
interpretive problems of CERCLA, but the new section 121, while a jumble of
disparate Congressional concerns, is also unusually specific about the criteria
that the EPA is to consider in remedy selection and the priorities and
preferences among them.
A careful reading of two subsections of section 121 suggests a fairly
coherent hierarchy of values in remedy selection decisions. The ultimate
standard to be achieved is a cost-effective remedy that "is protective of' 5 or
"assures protection of"59 human health and the environment. 6 ° A number of
preferences are also stated.' 61 Permanent solutions are preferred over
temporary ones, and treatments to reduce toxicity and mobility are preferred
over disposal (i.e., some form of containment). 62 Congress created incentives
for on-site management of wastes by discouraging transportation 163 and by
applying the stringent hazardous waste standards to off-site disposal."
Congress also wanted to assure uniformity with other hazardous waste
situations, so it required that Superfund sites follow all "applicable or relevant
and appropriate" requirements (ARAR) of federal and state law,"65 though this
can be waived in stated circumstances. 66 Finally, section 121 identifies a
number of other considerations that the EPA is to take into account in its
remedy selection decisions: long-term effectiveness, long-term uncertainties,
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) on-site requirements, risk
(toxicity and exposure), short- and long-term health effects, long-term
maintenance costs, potential future remediation costs, the dangers of
remediation activities, experience elsewhere, and the support vel non of
interested parties.'67
157. For an influential case starting the trend, see United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326,
1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
158. CERCLA § 121(b)(1).
159. § 121(d)(1).
160. See § 121(b)(1). The cost-effectiveness criterion can also be found in § 105(a)(7).
161. The EPA is required specifically to justify any departure from statutory preferences. See
§ 121(b)(2).
162. See § 121(b)(1).
163. See id.
164. See § 121(d)(3). The hazardous waste standards come from the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA). See 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1994).
165. See CERCLA § 121(d)(2),(3).
166. See§ 121(d)(4).
167. See § 121(b)(l)(A)-(G), (b)(2).
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There are two points of particular importance in this litany of factors.
First, Congress was clearly aware of the issue of remediation risk and directly
addressed it. In addition to the general instruction to consider the short-term
potential for adverse health effects,"'8 it specifically identified dangerous
remediation activities as "the potential threat to human health and the
environment associated with excavation, transportation and redisposal, or
containment. ' " 9 While treatment risks are not mentioned in this subparagraph,
they are largely covered by RCRA. 7 ° Together, these provisions encompass
virtually all of the remediation risks discussed above. In addition, SARA
permits a waiver from the ARAR requirements when "compliance... will
result in greater risk to human health and the environment than alternative
options."''
Second, this attention to remediation risks is overshadowed by the
statute's aggressive favoring of permanent remedies. This is expressed both in
the number of criteria that point in that direction and their place in the
statutory hierarchy. Both permanence and treatment (which is a more
permanent solution than mere containment) are accorded explicit preference
status.172 Long-term effectiveness is not called a preference, but the EPA is
directed "specifically [to] address" this factor. 173 The stated concerns for long-
term uncertainties, persistence of a hazardous substance, long-term adverse
effects, long-term maintenance costs, and future remediation needs all
reinforce this emphasis on the target condition of the site, that is, the
foreseeable future and beyond.
The preference for long-term solutions is also strong because it is an
eminently sensible position for Congress to take. Detailed policy analysis is
not required to see the desirability (all other things being equal) of permanent
solutions in terms of human and environmental health, total cost, and
administrative convenience. 74 Conversely, it is reasonable for Congress to
downplay remediation risk to the extent that it would interfere with its long-
168. See § 121(b)(l)(D).
169. § 121(b)(l)(G).
170. See generally United States v. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 886 F.2d 355, 358
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (discussing the issue of short-term risk of treatment in RCRA regulations).
171. CERCLA § 121(d)(4)(B).
172. See§ 121(b)(1).
173. Id.
174. All other things are not equal, of course, and current proposals for legislative reform seek to
eliminate the treatment, permanence, and ARAR requirements as unrealistic and, in some cases,
counterproductive. Indeed, Superfund reform legislation would allow consideration of future land use
controls as ways to protect the public. See Superfund: House Democrats Circulate Draft Proposal on
Remedy Selection, Community Grants, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 717 (1997); see also Benefits and Costs,
supra note 11, at 184-85 (describing the high cost of the preference for permanent remedies). It seems
unlikely, however, that the general preference for long-term solutions will disappear, though it may
become less dominant.
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term preference. Our point in this Article, therefore, is not that CERCLA is
wrong-headed in its lack of emphasis on remediation risk, but rather that the
EPA's site-specific decisions de-emphasize it to the vanishing point. It is one
thing to override remediation risk in favor of other concerns; it is quite another
to ignore it. Moreover, as the foregoing analysis shows, ignoring or virtually
ignoring remediation risk is inconsistent with the statutory language.
B. Regulatory Translation
If one thinks of section 121 as an unassembled jigsaw puzzle of relevant
factors, then it was the EPA's job, in developing the NCP, to piece it together
into a coherent, manageable structure for remedy selection decisions.175 For
the most part, the EPA did its job exceptionally well. It derived from the text
of section 121 nine remedy selection criteria,'76 which it further arranged into
a hierarchy of three categories that indicate the weight to be accorded each
criterion."' It is a logical, serviceable framework for decisionmaking.
The most important group of factors is called the threshold criteria, 178
which constitute minimum standards that must be met in every case (unless
waived). The first criterion, "overall protection of human health and the
environment," draws on several other criteria (including long-term
effectiveness and permanence, short-term effectiveness, and compliance with
ARARs) and demands that a selected remedy eliminate, reduce, or control the
baseline site hazards to a certain level. 179 A risk-based standard, it requires the
target condition of the site to meet a residual individual risk level between
Ixl0"4 and lx10-6 excess cancers. 80 The second threshold criterion,
"compliance with ARARs," requires that the selected remedy meet the federal
and state requirements that would otherwise apply to the site. The most
important ARARs are quantitative or numerical standards drawn from water,
air quality, and hazardous waste regulations.'8 '
175. The NCP is the basic regulatory framework for the EPA's clean-up activities. Its creation
(actually, revision-the NCP was originally developed for oil spills pursuant to the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1321 (1994)) is required by CERCLA § 105.
176. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(O(1)(i) (1997).
177. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(9)(iii) (1997).
178. See OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
GUIDANCE FOR CONDUCTING REMEDIAL INVESTIGATIONS AND FEASIBILITY STUDIES UNDER CERCLA
§ 6.2 (1988) [hereinafter RI/FS GUIDANCE].
179. Id. § 6.2.3.1.
180. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2) (1997); see also John S. Applegate, The Perils of
Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
261, 270-71 (1991) (describing the narrative risk standard of CERCLA).
181. ARARs are subdivided into chemical-specific, action-specific, and location-specific
ARARs. See RIl/S GUIDANCE, supra note 178, § 6.2.3.2. CERCLA specifically mentions the Safe
Drinking Water Act and Clean Water Act standards. See CERCLA § 121(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)
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At the other end of the spectrum, the so-called "modifying criteria"
include "state acceptance," which refers to technical or administrative issues
raised by state regulators, and "community acceptance," or public concerns.
The modifying criteria are intended at most to adjust a remedy that already has
been identified as the "preferred alternative," '182 and they have been criticized
for that reason.' 83
In the middle are the "primary balancing criteria," by which the EPA
attempts to fine-tune the remedy selection.8 4 While the threshold criteria tend
to require quantitative levels of achievement, the balancing criteria specify
other important characteristics of the remedy selection. The first of these
criteria, "long-term effectiveness and permanence," addresses the residual
risks after remedial action is complete.' 85 "Reduction of toxicity, mobility, or
volume" reflects the statutory preference for the use of treatment technologies
that provide permanent solutions.'86 "Short-term effectiveness" refers to
remediation risks, and it includes risks to the community, workers, and
environment during remediation, as well as the elapsed time to completion.'87
"Implementability" means the administrative and technical feasibility of
implementing a remedial alternative, including the availability of necessary
services and materials.'88 And "cost" subsumes the capital and operating costs
of the remedy.' 89
The threshold-balancing-modifying framework is one way in which the
NCP channels consideration of the statutory criteria. The framework also
gives explicit guidance for performing the comparisons and making the
necessary trade-offs among the criteria. 9 ° It reemphasizes the primacy of the
protectiveness and ARAR thresholds; it further defines cost-effectiveness; and
it restates the preferences for permanent solutions and treatment. The NCP
concludes:
The balancing [of the primary balancing criteria] shall emphasize
long-term effectiveness and reduction of toxicity, mobility, or volume
through treatment. The balancing shall also consider the preference
for treatment as a principal element and the bias against off-site land
(1994).
182. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(i)(C) (1997).
183. See John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizens Advisory Boards in
Administrative Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L.J. 903, 912-13 (1998).
184. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(i)(B) (1997).
185. See RI/FS GUIDANCE, supra note 178, § 6.2.3.3.
186. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(9)(iii)(D) (1997).
187. 40 C.F.R1 § 300.430(e)(9)(iii)(E) (1997).
188. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(9)(iii)(F) (1997).
189. 40 C.F.R. §300.430(e)(9)(iii)(G) (1997).
190. See40 C.F.R. § 300.430()(1)(ii) (1997).
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disposal of untreated waste. In making the determination under this
paragraph, the modifying criteria... shall also be considered.'9'
These directions for the actual balancing operation mention every one of the
nine criteria, including the lowly modifying criteria, except those having to do
with the remedial activities themselves, that is, implementability and short-
term effectiveness.192 If this is merely an oversight, it is surely Freudian.
The EPA has not been entirely silent on the meaning of "short-term
effectiveness," however. The NCP states that the determination of short-term
effectiveness for a given remedy should focus on the effects of the
implementation of the remedy on the community, workers, and the natural
environment during the period of remediation activity. The components of
such an evaluation, accordingly, are:
1) short-term risks that might be posed to the community during the
implementation of an alternative;
2) potential impacts on workers during remedial action and the effectiveness
and reliability of protective measures;
3) potential environmental impacts of the remedial action and the
effectiveness and reliability of mitigative measures during implementation;
and
4) time until protection is achieved.'93
The NCP therefore clearly uses the term "short-term effectiveness" to refer to
the remediation or transition period, 194 whereas "long-term" refers to
everything after that-both the foreseeable future and long-term
stewardship.'95
191. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(1)(ii)(E) (1997).
192. One might detect a concern for remedial risks in the bias against transportation even though
there are other reasons for that directive.
193. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(9)(iii)(E) (1997).
194. Id.
195. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(9)(iii)(C) (1997); see also National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8722 (1990) (distinguishing between short-term and
long-term risks in response to a comment).
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FIGURE 5
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Furthermore, short-term effectiveness, as described by the EPA, measures the
risks caused by the implementation of the remedy and incurred by the
community, workers, and the environment during that period. Short-term
effectiveness does not measure the achievement of clean-up goals or the
reduction of the baseline risk in the near future. The continuing effects of
contaminants already present on the site are not part of the analysis,'96 as the
EPA's original explanation of these provisions confirms.'97
Thus, like section 121, the NCP includes a potentially adequate
consideration of remediation risks. The receptors (if not the sources) of the
risks are all identified, and the duration problem (i.e., the longer the project,
the more effort, the more risk) is flagged. However, several aspects of the
NCP distinctly weaken the role of remediation risk. First, the name "short-
term effectiveness" is poorly chosen. By speaking of "effectiveness" instead
of "risk," it implies that the real issue is early reductions in the baseline risk.
That is not an implausible concern, so the terminology invites
196. This makes good sense; the short-term risks of the contamination are to be managed
through removal and abatement actions. See CERCLA § 101 (23)-(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)-(24) (1994)
(defining temporary and permanent remedial actions); § 104(a)(2) (requiring that temporary actions be
consistent with subsequent permanent ones).
The Risk Assessment Guidance confuses matters somewhat by asserting that "[s]hort-term health
risks generally include any current baseline risks plus any new risks that would occur while
implementing the remedy." RAGS, supra note 27, at 18. However, the "current baseline risks plus any
new risks" measurement is not mentioned elsewhere in RAGS and directly contradicts the NCP and
R/FS Guidance.
197. The preamble to the NCP identified short-term effectiveness as the criterion used to address
the effects of the remedial alternative "during the construction and implementation phase" until the site
objectives are accomplished. Examples of factors that affect short-term effectiveness are the dust caused
by excavation, the risk involved in the transportation of hazardous materials, or the negative impact on
air quality that could occur through a stripping tower operation. Additionally, the assessment is intended
to "consider who may be exposed during the remedial action, what risks those populations may face,
how those risks can be mitigated, and what risks cannot be readily controlled." National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8721 (1990). Potential adverse impacts
on the environment due to construction and implementation of an alternative should be assessed, and an
evaluation should be undertaken of the reliability of the available mitigation measures in preventing or
reducing potential impacts. See id. at 8721-22.
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misinterpretation. Second, short-term effectiveness obscures the statute's
specific mention of excavation and other sources of remediation risk in its
general description of receptors, reducing the attention that Congress paid to
it. Third, remediation risk ends up as a single criterion out of nine in the NCP,
whereas section 121 mentioned it three times. Fourth, the NCP marginalizes
worker risk in its overall analysis by its assumption that workers are
adequately protected by occupational standards, making further consideration
of risks to them unnecessary.' 8 Finally, the elevation of the easily measurable,
quantitative ARARs to threshold status and the reemphasis on the balancing
instructions of long-term effectiveness and treatment implicitly relegate other
considerations to a lesser role. None of these changes to the statutory structure
would be decisive in itself, perhaps, but together they send a clear signal in the
NCP that remediation risks are to be considered only briefly, if at all. Since
RPMs have considerable discretion in choosing a remedy,'99 such signals can
have a major impact on actual decisions. Indeed, The RPM Primer describes
the criteria that RPMs and the Regional Administrator must use in developing
and approving the remedy selection at a clean-up site, yet it does not even
mention "short-term effectiveness" or any aspect of remediation risk.2"
The EPA's RI/FS Guidance adds relatively little descriptive material to
the NCP on this issue. The Superfund Risk Assessment Guidance, however, is
more helpful. 1 Evaluation of short-term human health risks during the initial
development and screening of alternatives in the FS is very brief and intended
merely to identify alternatives with clearly unacceptable short-term risks.202
Risk evaluation during the FS's detailed analysis of alternatives is much more
complex. The main near-term focus is the risk of each alternative remedy for
the community and workers during implementation, so that they can be
compared with other alternatives. 203 The first step in the risk evaluation is to
decide whether a quantitative or qualitative risk evaluation is necessary, based
on the importance of relative short-term effectiveness in a particular
alternative and the degree of "perceived risk" associated with the alternative.
Several factors can lead to a higher "perceived risk," such as the close
proximity of populations, the presence of highly or acutely toxic chemicals,
198. The Worker Protection Standards for Hazardous Waste are codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120
(1997) and 40 C.F.R. § 311 (1997). These standards establish requirements for worker protection at
CERCLA sites. The EPA underscored the difference between short- and long-term risks by stating that it
would determine the degree of protection for on-site workers by occupational standards rather than by
the NCP's lifetime cancer risk standard. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8679-80 (1990).
199. See Ferris & Rees, supra note 149, at 839-44.
200. See RPM PRIMER, supra note 152, at 15-17, 19 (discussing the FS and ROD approval).
201. See RAGS, supra note 27, at 8-9.
202. See id. at 12.
203. See id. at 7, 15-21.
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technologies with a high release potential, and releases that occur over long
periods of time.2" The actual evaluation of short-term human health risks2. 5
considers exposure, 2°6 toxicity values that are relevant to risks from shorter
exposures, 20 7 and characterization of short-term risks to the community and to
workers. This process is similar to the baseline risk assessment, but the
analysis is to be qualitative instead of more rigorously quantitative.2 °8
To summarize, the various parts of the legal framework for remedy
selection under CERCLA display a consistent view of short-term or
remediation risk. The statute, the NCP, and EPA guidance all provide a clear
direction to consider remediation risk in site remedy selection decisions.
However, to varying degrees they all clearly subordinate remediation risks to
other considerations, notably baseline risk reduction and the permanent
achievement of low target risks.
C. Worker Risk
Before proceeding to the analysis of RODs, a few words are needed
concerning the relevance of worker or occupational risk to Superfund remedy
selection. Worker risk is, as we have seen, a major component of remediation
risk. Without worker risk, the problem of ignoring remediation risk would still
be significant, though perhaps less compelling. At one level, it is worth asking
whether RODs adequately consider worker risk as part of remediation risk,
because if they do not, then the law is not being followed. More
fundamentally, our interest in worker risk implicitly assumes that worker risk
should be part of Superfund remedy selection. That is, while in this Article we
do not prescribe the particular weight to be given to worker or remediation
risk as against other risk and nonrisk factors, we do assert that worker risk
should be given some weight.
It should be clear that worker risk stands on somewhat different ground
than risk to the general public. At least to some extent, workers voluntarily
assume the risks of their work, which their pay should reflect. In addition,
they generally have a greater degree of control over the extent of the risks, as
204. See id. at 16. Other factors that affect perceived risk include a high uncertainty in the nature
of the release that may characterize innovative technologies, multiple contaminants and/or exposure
pathways affecting the same individual, multiple releases occurring simultaneously, or multiple releases
occurring from remedial actions at several operable units in close proximity. See id.
205. See id. at 17-21.
206. This includes release sources, receiving media, fate and transport, exposure points, exposure
routes, and receptors associated with a particular remedial alternative.
207. Exposure that lasts minutes, hours, or a full day is a "single exposure element." Exposure
that lasts for up to two weeks is "very short-term" exposure. Exposure that lasts two weeks to seven
years is "short-term" exposure. See RAGS, supra note 27, at 20.
208. See id. at 19-20.
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they are both risk creators and risk receptors. There are two principal
objections, flowing from these facts, to considering worker risk at all in
remedy selection. We address each briefly, in turn.
The first objection argues that because workers have voluntarily assumed
the risk, the regulatory system has no further role to play.2° 9 Their wages, at
least in theory, include a "risk premium" to compensate for the extra hazard to
life and limb. The asserted voluntariness of occupational risks depends both
on the psychological assumption that workers are more risk preferring"' and
on the idea of a risk premium that compensates workers through higher wages
for engaging in hazardous activities. 211 The psychological element has been
debated extensively, and those who deny that the workers' assumption of risk
is voluntary usually point to the lack of adequate understanding of the risks
and to social and economic pressures that undermine the idea of consent.212
Even those who believe that voluntary assumption of risk is possible concede
that market failures such as inadequate information would undermine
voluntariness.213 In principle, risk premiums ought to be susceptible to
verification or refutation, but efforts to do so have proven quite difficult. Kip
Viscusi claims to have developed clear evidence of a wage premium for
hazardous jobs,214 but others have challenged his conclusions. 2 5 In the
absence of a clear demonstration that worker risk is voluntarily assumed as a
matter of informed preference or higher compensation, we do not believe that
it is appropriate to exclude it from the remedy selection analysis.
The second objection is that occupational risks that do not rise above the
risks ordinarily encountered in construction and transportation (i.e.,
mechanical risks) should not be counted, because in all likelihood the workers
would be doing the same work for other employers. Therefore, the argument
209. This argument is strengthened by the applicability of OSHA regulations, noted above, that
require the elimination of most egregious hazards in the workplace.
210. See W. KIP VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEATH AND SAFETY IN THE
WORKPLACE 45-53 (1983); Richard L. Abel, Risk As an Arena of Struggle, 83 MICH. L. REv. 772, 777
& n. 15 (1985) (book review) (disagreeing with the assumption, but citing proponents of this idea).
211. See MICHAEL J. MOORE & W. KIp VISCUSI, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR JOB RISKS:
WAGES, WORKERS' COMPENSATION, AND PRODUCT LIABILITY 13-14 (1990); VISCUSi, supra note 210, at
38-45 (detailing the risk premium argument).
212. See THOMAS 0. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED
PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 18-20 (1993); Thomas 0.
McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA's Critics and Regulatory Reform, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 587,
605-07 (1996); Elinor Schroeder & Sidney A. Shapiro, Responses to Occupational Disease, 72 GEO.
L.J. 1231, 1239-44 (1984). But see VISCUSI, supra note 210, at 76-77 (claiming that the existence of a
wage premium demonstrates worker understanding of hazards).
213. See W. Kip Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim
Compensation and Risk Regulation, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 53, 56-60 (1984); VIScUSI, supra note 8, at 44.
214 See VISCUSI, supra note 210, at 38-45.
215. See generally MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 212; McGarity & Shapiro, supra note
212; Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 212.
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goes, there is no net increase in risk to the workers. The principal difficulty
with this argument is that it is speculative. We do not really know what an
individual would be doing if not the work at this particular site. The
alternative might be more or less safe. Indeed, the no-net-increase argument
proves too much. If we were to count only net increases in risk for all
purposes, we could never determine the risk of any activity. We would always
have to reduce it by the risks of whatever the person might otherwise be
doing. 16 The actual activity before us creates a focal point for our weighting
of risks, and the risks of alternative activities do not change the character of
the one under consideration.
The foregoing objections to the consideration of worker risk have
undeniable force, but they are more properly considered in assigning weight to
worker risk rather than its admissibility. The precise relative weight to be
given to worker risk and to remediation risk generally is a difficult, value-
laden question. It is probably not susceptible to general rules and is certainly
beyond the scope of this Article. But no decision based on the life cycle of
Superfund risks would be complete without consideration of worker risk.
III. Analysis of Records of Decision
The observation that prompted this study and that became our working
hypothesis was that remediation risks receive only perfunctory analysis in
RODs and have little or no discernible impact on the selection of the remedy.
This observation is something of a truism among persons familiar with the
Superfund remedy selection process in practice. They generally believe that
remediation risk is either ignored or takes a back seat to other factors.217 The
hypothesis receives implicit confirmation from published descriptions of the
remedy selection process that simply pass over remediation risk, often without
any apparent awareness of the omission,2 Is as did the EPA materials described
216. To take an extreme example, parachuting would not be considered very dangerous at all
since the parachutist might otherwise be skiing or driving or performing some other dangerous activity.
Similarly, exposure to benzene in a rubber factory would not be risky since the worker might
alternatively be exposed to cotton dust in a mill. In other words, "alternative risks" are at best inchoate.
But see RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 5, at 21-22 (arguing for examining the "first, nearest and biggest"
alternatives).
217. See OTA, supra note 25, at 19-20, 22-23 (reporting that Superfund practitioners believe that
remediation risk takes a back seat to other NCP criteria); Cross, supra note 5, at 901 n.260 (quoting Alan
Krupnick of Resources for the Future as remarking that RODs often do not even mention the dangers to
remediation workers); Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 5, at 19 ("Created risks tend to be ignored
completely when new expenditures are principally designed for risk reduction, as with... the cleanup of
Superfund sites."); Gerrard & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 3. This was further confirmed by our own
conversations with present and former EPA Superfund officials.
218. See Mar et al., supra note 5, at 131. For examples of risk assessments that omit remediation
risk, see Brett et al., supra note 64, passim (omitting conventional risks while studying materials risks);
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above. Like most truisms, however, this observation has not been
systematically tested. A study based on characterizations like "perfunctory"
and "discernible impact" resists quantification. Nevertheless, we have sought
to devise a methodology that will yield useful, replicable results and that will
confirm or reject our hypothesis.
A. Methodology
In the remedy selection process, as we have seen, the ROD documents the
remedy finally selected for a particular site as well as the reasons for the
choice. The ROD identifies and compares the remedial alternatives that were
analyzed in the FS; it summarizes the facts, analyses, and policies that were
considered; and it explains how the nine evaluation criteria were used in the
selection of the remedy.219 Thus, RODs are, in theory at least, the ideal
resources through which to investigate actual remedy selection practices, since
they encapsulate the entire process. Moreover, they are readily available from
a number of sources.
Reviewing RODs is not a perfect way to study Superfund practices,
however. RODs are summaries and as such sacrifice detail. They are also the
principal medium for communicating the remedy selection decision to the
public,22 so there may be a tendency to sacrifice completeness for readability.
Others who have used RODs to study Superfund have expressed similar
misgivings, 221 and other studies have relied instead on detailed case studies of
a few sites.222 For the purpose of uncovering a general tendency in remedy
selection, however, detailed site data are not critical and review of a few cases
would be inadequate. The RI/FS documents clearly would have provided
more complete information, but our analysis did not require detailed risk data,
and we had no reason to suspect that the RODs do not faithfully reflect at least
the topics covered in the RI/FS analysis.223
Craig Zamuda, Superfund Risk Assessments: The Process and Past Experience at Uncontrolled
Hazardous Waste Sites, in THE RISK ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH HAZARDS
266, 266-95 (Dennis J. Paustenbach ed., 1989) (omitting worker risk in a detailed description of
Superfund risk assessment process).
219. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(4)-(5) (1997).
220. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(0(6) (1997). The proposed plan serves as the vehicle for public
comment before the remedy is selected. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(0(2)-(3) (1997).
221. See Robert H. Abrams, Using Experience to Improve Superfund Remedy Selection, 29 U.
RICH. L. REV. 581, 593 (1995) (explaining that RODs do not contain detailed remedy selection data);
Human Health Risk, supra note 3, at 589 (discussing the need to go beyond RODs to obtain detailed
baseline risk assessment data).
222. See THOMAS W. CHURCH & ROBERT T. NAKAMURA, CLEANING UP THE MESS:
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES IN SUPERFUND (1993); JOHN A. HIRD, SUPERFUND: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK (1994).
223. OTA noted that RI/FSs do not, in fact, provide much data on occupational risk. See OTA,
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We obtained the text of the RODs from the Westlaw RODs database.224
To minimize selection bias, we reviewed all of the available RODs from EPA
Region V, which includes Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and
Minnesota. While this encompasses only a portion of the country, these states
are the heart of the industrial Midwest (less flatteringly, the Rust Belt) and a
rich source of Superfund sites and experience. We are, admittedly,
extrapolating from the results in a single administrative region, and the EPA's
regions have a tradition of independence. 225 The corroboration of our
hypothesis by the literature described above, however, leads us to believe that
a regional study is sufficient to test the hypothesis.
We also limited our review to RODs from 1988 and later. The EPA's
RI/FS Guidance was released in 1988 and for the first time singled out the
short-term effectiveness criterion in its current form. Therefore, findings of
dismissive treatment before the Guidance would be difficult to interpret. They
could be merely evidence of the failure of the immature Superfund program to
focus on this issue. After the 1988 Guidance, which clearly identified
remediation risk issues, this possibility has been largely ruled out.226 As of
September 3, 1997, the Westlaw database contained 124 Region V RODs
from this period. Of these, sixteen were unusable either because the ROD did
not compare any alternatives or because the comparison was sketchy. 27
Separate analyses were made for multiple operable units within a single ROD.
The net result is that a total of 113 separate analyses were made.
The analysis entailed reading the ROD for the following features relating
to the thoroughness of the consideration of short-term and occupational risk:
1) How much weight was given to the short-term effectiveness criterion? (This
was determined by examining whether the remedy selected was the same as
the remedy with the greatest short-term effectiveness or otherwise appeared
to be influenced by short-term effects.)
supra note 25, at 22-23.
224. See generally WL, Database EDR-ROD.
225. See JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 74-75
(1995).
226. In addition, the current version of the NCP itself was formally proposed on December 21,
1988, though it was adopted a year and a half later. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan, 53 Fed. Reg. 51,394 (1988). The proposed rule defined short-term
effectiveness as "impacts of the [remedial] alternatives-i.e., impacts during implementation-on the
neighboring community, the workers, or the surrounding environment, including threats to human health
and the environment associated with excavation, treatment, and transportation of hazardous substances."
Id. at 51,428 (1988). The idea of short-term effectiveness thus seems to have been in general circulation
by 1988.
227. We also discounted a few of these RODs because they made extensive use of charts that
were not available through Westlaw.
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2) Did the ROD identify and discuss all four subcategories of short-term
effectiveness? (In particular, the ROD was examined for whether it
considered risk to workers, the community, the environment, and the time
to completion.)
3) Was worker risk taken seriously or treated dismissively? (This was
identified, for example, through the use of boilerplate language2.8 about the
effectiveness of personal protective gear, instead of a site-specific analysis.)
Obviously, these are not quantitative evaluations like cost or risk data and thus
are not susceptible to clearly objective measurement. We therefore looked
elsewhere for informal standards against which RODs could be measured. The
Fernald RODs provided one control, as noted above. The EPA's RI/FS
Guidance, while it adds little substance to the current NCP, provides a list of
questions that need to be addressed during the analysis of short-term
effectiveness. The Guidance shows exactly how the EPA expects RPMs to
analyze short-term effectiveness. It particularly looks for the following:
Protection of community during remedial actions
" What are the risks to the community during remedial actions that
must be addressed?
" How will the risks to the community be addressed and mitigated?
* What risks remain to the community that cannot be readily
controlled?
Protection of workers during remedial actions
" What are the risks to the workers that must be addressed?
" What risks remain to the workers that cannot be readily
controlled?
" How will the risks to the workers be addressed and mitigated?
Environmental impacts
" What environmental impacts are expected with the construction
and implementation of the alternative?
" What are the available mitigation measures to be used and what is
their reliability to minimize potential impacts?
228. "Boilerplate" is conventionally defined as "language which is used commonly in documents
having a definite meaning in the same context without variation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 175 (6th
ed. 1990). As is described in more detail below, we take the use of boilerplate as an indication that little
individualized analysis has gone into the ROD. See infra Subsection III.B.4. Of course, there are only a
limited number of verbal ways to express that worker risk has been accounted for, so the use of
boilerplate language does not in itself prove that worker risk received minimal attention. However, it is
consistent with such an interpretation in the context of the rest of each ROD, and it is consistent with the
other evidence assembled from other RODs.
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* What are the impacts that cannot be avoided should the
alternative be implemented?
Time until remedial response objectives are achieved
* How long until protection against the threats being addressed by
the specific action is achieved?
* How long until any remaining site threats will be addressed?
* How long until remedial response objectives are achieved?229
A thorough ROD ought to answer these questions, and we used the Guidance
as the "gold standard" for the purposes of the second and third features of
thoroughness.
A ROD is a summary, however, and may appropriately be more terse than
the R1/FS Guidance questions suggest. To account for this, we regarded far
less verbiage than included in an RI/FS to be a reasonably thorough analysis
of remediation risks in the ROD. The following excerpt from one of the RODs
that we reviewed reflects what we viewed as a moderately complete analysis:
[1] With respect to protection of the community, alternatives 1
through 5 will not pose risks to the local community, though
there may be temporary inconveniences. Alternatives 4 and 5
which involve excavation may result in increased dust generation
but this can be controlled through conventional dust suppression
techniques.
[2] Risks to workers during remedial action in alternatives 1 through
5 can be controlled with safe working practices. Alternatives 4
and 5 may expose workers to VOCs from excavated soils but the
levels should be within applicable PELs and TLVs.
[3] With respect to environmental impacts,. . . alternatives 3, 4, and
5 will result in a temporary change in groundwater flow from
extraction and pit dewatering and a temporary increase in the
flow rate in the bayou from the discharged groundwater.
Alternatives 4 and 5 could result in the release of low levels of
VOC to the air from the soil excavation.
[4] Evaluation of the time until protection is achieved reveals the
following estimates: alternative 2 should take a few weeks to a
few months, alternative 4 should take 5-6 months, and
229. RI/FS GUIDANCE, supra note 178, at tbl.6-3.
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alternatives 3 and 5 should take 4-5 years. Alternatives I and 6
will not achieve protection.
With these guidelines in mind, we now turn to the results.
B. Findings
1. Weight Accorded to Short-Term Effectiveness
The first step in determining the weight accorded to short-term
effectiveness in the remedy selection decision was to see what the ROD said
about it. When that failed or was inconclusive, which was usually the case, we
compared the apparent ranking of the selected remedy in terms of both short-
and long-term effectiveness on a scale of high, moderate, or low, relative to
the alternatives that were considered. This determination was necessarily
subjective since the RODs themselves rarely ranked the effectiveness of
remedies in this way.231 This was also only a rough indicator of weight,
because seven other criteria also influence remedy selection; however, we
judged that any such attempt, absent a multiple regression analysis, would
have this limitation. In fact, the failure to provide this kind of ranking in the
RODs is in itself troubling. It hampers not only retrospective analysis but,
more importantly, contemporaneous technical and public review, thereby
effectively obscuring the trade-offs between short- and long-term risk and
among different short-term risks.
Of the 85 selected remedies compared to alternatives, 40 remedies ranked
higher in long-term effectiveness than short-term effectiveness, 35 remedies
ranked equally in long- and short-term effectiveness, and only 10 remedies
obtained a higher ranking in short-term effectiveness than long-term
effectiveness. That is, only 10 cases gave a clear indication that short-term
effectiveness had strongly influenced the outcome. This is actually a relatively
high percentage (12%) in light of our expectations, though some of the
apparent preference for short-term effectiveness may well be a preference for
on-site management, implementability, or another criterion. Review of the
RODs for this characteristic, therefore, did not contradict our hypothesis, but
was inconclusive of its validity.
230. Hedblum Indus., Oscoda, Mich., EPA ID MID980794408 (Sept. 29, 1989), available in
WL, Database EDR-ROD.
231. Only a very few RODs employ this technique. See Reilly Tar & Chem., Indianapolis, Ind.,
EPA ID IND1000289722 (Sept. 30, 1993), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD. More commonly, the
ROD lists each alternative and gives a reason why it may cause short-term risks, without making a
definitive comparison. See Fisher Calo Chem, Kingsbury, Ind., EPA ID fND074315896 (Aug. 7, 1990),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD.
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2. Completeness ofAnalysis
Our most quantitative analysis measured whether the ROD separately
discussed and analyzed all four subcategories of short-term effectiveness. This
was a rarity.232 Only 33 of the 113 analyzed remedies (29% of the examined
RODs) actually mentioned all four subcategories. Conversely, 71% discussed
three or fewer subcategories, in clear contravention of the NCP and EPA
Guidance. The norm among RODs is to look at short-term risk in general, as
opposed to relating risk respectively to workers, the community, and the
environment.233 While this approach may be adequate for some situations, it
certainly is not appropriate where the risk implications for these receptors
differ, as they frequently do.234 RODs often separately estimate the "time for
completion of the remedy" criterion, 3' but usually without the other three.
These findings clearly support the hypothesis that remediation risks are
inadequately considered. They suggest that when presented with conflicting
signals, RPMs are following the tone or spirit of the NCP and Guidance
(which marginalize remediation risk) rather than their letter.236
3. Misapplication of Short-Term Effectiveness
A disturbing and quite unexpected finding was that RPMs not only
underapply short-term risk analysis, but that they often misapply it as well. As
we have discussed previously, the term "short-term effectiveness" seems to
invite the incorrect interpretation that it is an analysis of the near-term effects
of the baseline contamination, rather than of the risks of implementation. Of
the 113 selected remedies, 25 (22%) misstated or misapplied short-term
effectiveness. For instance, one ROD described the "no action" alternative for
232. The Hedblum ROD, used above as an example on this point, was one of the exceptions. See
Hedblum Indus., Oscoda, Mich., EPA ID MID980794408 (Sept. 29, 1989), available in WL, Database
EDR-ROD.
233. The United Scrap Lead ROD analyzed short-term effectiveness in the following manner:
"In all alternatives (except no action) there will be a slight increase in dust due to construction activities.
Good construction practices should minimize this. Protection will be achieved in the shortest period of
time (17 months) in alternative I and take the longest -in alternative 4 (48 months)." United Scrap Lead,
Troy, Ohio, EPA ID OHD18392928 (Sept. 30, 1988), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD. Such a
description of short-term effectiveness does not adequately explain how the hazards relate to different
groups. See also Republic Steel Quarry, Elyria, Ohio, EPA ID OHD980903447 (Sept. 30, 1988),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD ("All alternatives considered to address the on-site surface soil
contamination, with the exception of alternative 1 (no action) are effective in the short term.").
234. See supra p.279 tbll.
235. See Organic Chems., Inc., Grandville, Mich., EPA ID MID990858003 (Sept. 30, 1991),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD.
236. See Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air
Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1670-73, 1678-81 (1991) (describing "laws" of agency behavior that trump the
statutory command).
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a site as not being effective in the short-term since groundwater would still
pose an unacceptable risk at the site.237 This is an improper interpretation of
short-term effectiveness, the analysis of which should address the risks of an
alternative during the construction and implementation stage of a remedial
action. If there is no remedial action then there is no construction or
implementation, and short-term effectiveness would be at its highest (and
short-term risk at its lowest). Without implementation of a remedy, it is
impossible for workers, the community, or the environment to experience
risks from that remedy.
Some RODs misapplied short-term effectiveness only when they
described the "no action" alternative and applied it correctly for the other
remedial alternatives. For example, one ROD stated that "[a]lternative 1 [no
action] would not be effective in addressing contamination from the site," but
then analyzed other alternatives as causing short-term impacts such as noise
and dust from the construction of a cap.238 Another ROD incorrectly applied
short-term effectiveness to the no action alternative and to other alternatives,
but then applied it correctly to a different alternative.239 Yet another simply
stated that "[a]ll action alternatives are more effective in reducing risks to the
local community and the environment than the no action alternative."24 °
237. See Perham Arsenic, Perham, Minn., EPA ID MND980609572 (Mar. 31, 1994), available
in WL Database, EDR-ROD.
238. See Coshocton City, Coshocton, Ohio, EPA ID OHD980509830 (June 17, 1988), available
in WL, Database EDR-ROD.
239. In its discussion of short-term effectiveness the Midstate Disposal Landfill ROD states:
Alternative I is not effective in protecting the public health and the environment because
there is no reduction of risk. Remedial objectives in the FS will not be obtained and, in
addition, water quality criteria will not be met. Alternatives 2 and 3 greatly reduce future
risk. Risk to community and workers during implementation is limited. Alternatives 4
through 7 may cause odors during stabilization and may involve some risk to workers.
Alternatives 5 through 7 provide further protection by reducing leachate production by at
least 75%.
Midstate Disposal Landfill, Cleveland Township, Wis., EPA ID WID980823082 (Sept. 30, 1988),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD.
The Waite Park Wells ROD analyzes short-term risk in the following manner:
Both of the protective alternatives, alternatives liA and IIIB, will provide a good degree of
short-term effectiveness since control of both shallow and deep aquifers can be
implemented quickly and treatment of the contaminated water will occur simultaneously
with essentially no adverse imlpct from implementation of the remedy. The other
alternatives, since they do not address the deep aquifer, the shallow aquifer, or both, do not
have adequate short-term effectiveness.
Waite Park Wells, Waite Park, Minn., EPA ID MND981002249 (Sept. 28, 1989), available in WL,
Database EDR-ROD; see also Naval Indus. Reserve Ordnance Plant, Fridley, Minn., EPA ID
MN3170022914 (Sept. 28, 1990), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (applying a similar analysis of
short-term effectiveness); Schmalz Dump, Harrison, Wis., EPA ID WID980820096 (Sept. 30, 1987),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (analyzing short-term effectiveness both correctly and
incorrectly).
240. Ninth Ave. Dump, Gary, Ind., EPA ID IND980794432 (Sept. 20, 1988), available in WL,
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It is astonishing that nearly one quarter of RODs demonstrate that the
RPMs who authored them misunderstood one of the criteria that they are
required to apply. The best explanation of this is undoubtedly the infelicitous
choice of "effectiveness" to describe this criterion, implying that remediation
should reduce risk in the near term. Since virtually all remedies increase risk
in the near term, the idea of risk reduction as a measure of remediation
activities is incoherent. The proper measure is the minimization of additional
risks, which the term "effectiveness" does not convey. The effect of this
misunderstanding is that remedies can be easily chosen without regard to
minimizing remedial risks, to the detriment of remedial workers, neighboring
communities, and the surrounding natural environment.
4. Treatment of Occupational Risks
Occupational risks are usually treated dismissively, if they are discussed
at all. The analysis of short-term effectiveness is supposed to include
"protection of workers during remedial actions," according to both the
regulations and the Guidance, but 53 of the remedies analyzed (47%)
discussed occupational risks using boilerplate language and 42 RODs (37%)
did not discuss it at all. The boilerplate statements assumed that workers
would be protected from risk by the use of "personal protective equipment,,
241
or that risks would be reduced through "health and safety plans. 242 Even
putting aside the fact that these assumptions do not reflect reality, 243 neither of
Database EDR-ROD. This ROD went on correctly to analyze the rest of the remedial alternatives. See
id.; see also New Brighton/Arden Hills, Arden Hills, Minn., EPA ID MN7213820908 (Aug. 11, 1989),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD ("Except for the no-action alternative, the remaining alternatives
would effectively alleviate the contamination problem at site D on the short-term basis.").
241. See Perham Arsenic, Perham, Minn., EPA ID MND980609572 (Mar. 31, 1994), available
in WL, Database EDR-ROD ("[I]mpacts to site workers during remediation will be controlled with the
use of the appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE), and by ensuring that site workers have the
appropriate training."); Auto Ion Chems., Inc., Kalamazoo, Mich., EPA ID MID980794382 (Sept. 27,
1989), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD ("These risks can be controlled by use of... personnel
protective equipment for controlling exposures for site workers."); Wausau Groundwater Contamination,
Wausau, Wis., EPA ID WID980993521 (Dec. 23, 1988), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD ("[S]ite
workers can be protected by personal protection equipment."); Ninth Ave. Dump, Gary, Ind., EPA ID
IND980794432 (Sept. 20, 1988), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD ("[C]onventional personnel
protection measures will be adequate to protect on-site workers.").
242. See South Andover Salvage Yards, Andover, Minn., EPA ID MND980609614 (May 31,
1994), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD ("[H]ealth and safety plans would require that all workers
be adequately protected during work."); Adams County Quincy Landfill, Quincy, Ill., EPA ID
ILD980607055 (Sept. 30, 1993), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD ("Worker health and safety
practices will be instituted."); Metamora Landfill, Metamora, Mich., EPA ID MID980506562 (Sept. 28,
1990), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD, ("Standard health and safety measures shall be followed
by the workers."); Hedblum Indus., Oscoda, Mich., EPA ID MID980794408 (Sept. 29, 1989), available
in WL, Database EDR-ROD ("Risks to workers.., can be controlled with safe working practices.").
243. See OTA, supra note 25, at 27-43 (finding that, for many reasons, protections for hazardous
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these boilerplate statements adequately examines the risks posed to workers
on a site-specific basis, as anticipated by the EPA Guidance. If only 16% of
RODs seriously discuss occupational risk, one must conclude that the
occupational risk of remedies does not play an important role in remedy
selection.
Even when a ROD mentions worker risk, the analysis almost never2"
reaches the level of detail specified by the Risk Assessment Guidance.24 5
While this information is required only in the RI/FS and not in the ROD, the
ROD should nonetheless summarize the information from the detailed
analysis. Instead, the ROD usually just notes that a particular action will not
result in any unacceptable short-term risks to workers,246 or it briefly states
that one particular remedy will increase short-term risk to workers.247 This
also may be attributable to the NCP's permitting the EPA to assume full
compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
hazardous waste regulations, even though such regulations purport neither to
eliminate all worker risk nor to guarantee full compliance.248 In any event, the
end result is that very few RODs adequately analyze short-term effectiveness
in relation to occupational risk.
We singled out occupational risk in our original methodology because we
expected it to be a bellwether for the adequacy of consideration of remediation
risk, since workers are the most obvious and most threatened remediation risk
receptor. If occupational risk is ignored or treated perfunctorily, it is unlikely
that other remediation risks will be considered more carefully. This proved to
be the case. Our hypothesis, that short-term risk would receive perfunctory
analysis and have little discernible impact on the ultimate remedy selection
decision, was confirmed with few exceptions. Remediation risk did not appear
to weigh heavily in decisions. Rarely were all four subparts of short-term risk
waste workers at Superfund sites have limited effectiveness).
244. For an example of a good overall analysis of short-term effectiveness, and in particular
occupational risk, see Reilly Tar & Chem., Indianapolis, Ind., EPA ID IND000807107 (Sept. 30, 1993),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD.
245. See RAGS, supra note 27, at 17-18 (describing the information required to assess worker
risk).
246. See Organic Chems., Inc., Grandville, Mich., EPA ID MID990858003 (Sept. 30, 1991),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD ("None of these alternatives will result in unacceptable short-term
risks to workers.").
247. See Midstate Disposal Landfill, Cleveland Township, Wis., EPA ID WID980823082 (Sept.
30, 1988), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD ("Alternatives 4 through 7 may... involve some
risk[s] to workers.").
248. See Gerrard & Goldberg, supra note 4, at 11. The relevant provision of the NCP is
40 C.F.R. § 300.150 (1997) and of the OSHA regulations is 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120 (1997). The Supreme
Court has held that OSHA is not expected to apply a zero-risk standard to the workplace. See Industrial
Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639-41 (1980). Thus, compliance with OSHA
regulations does not mean that there will be no worker risk.
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considered, and when they were they were often treated superficially. Most
strikingly, RODs often mischaracterized short-term risk as the risks posed by
the polluted present.
IV. Remedying Remedy Selection
A. The Significance of Remediation Risk
The fundamental reason to consider remediation risk in remedy selection
is the magnitude of the risk. All aggressive remedies (i.e., excluding access
restrictions and institutional controls on future land use) have real-life, near-
term effects on remediation workers, site neighbors, and the surrounding
environment. Whether or not they compare favorably with the baseline risks,
serious risk consequences flow from the choice of a CERCLA remedy. Just as
rational regulation cannot be oblivious to feasibility and cost,2 49 neither can it
be oblivious to its health and safety consequences, even (or especially) if they
are unintended.
The post hoc review of a particular ROD does not, of course, permit a
credible inference that full consideration of remediation risks would have
changed the remedy selection in a particular case in a particular way. Even
with more information (like the FS documents), any assertion that the
decisionmakers at the time would have chosen differently would be largely
speculative. Nevertheless, there is every reason to believe that full
consideration of remediation risks would affect remedy selection in the long
run because, as we have seen, 5 ' different remedies differ substantially in (i)
the degree of remediation, and (ii) the receptors of that risk. If the
decisionmakers are not simply indifferent to remediation risk, then over the
course of many remedy selections some decisions could be expected to
change, as in fact they have in some of the very few cases in which the ROD
did fully consider remediation risk.
1. Degree of Remediation
The degree of clean-up (or level of residual risk) affects short-term risk
because a higher clean-up standard (lower residual risk) normally requires
greater clean-up efforts. This is most obvious in the case of soil excavation,
which is a labor-intensive activity requiring the use of heavy machinery. The
concentration of contamination at a site is rarely uniform, but is rather a
gradient that decreases as it moves away from the source or sources of the
249. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATION
STATE 90 (1990) ("No sensible regulatory program... can be indifferent to cost.").
250. See supra p.279 tbl.1.
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contamination .25  In physical terms, then, the decision to achieve a lower
residual risk level means that more contaminated soil at lower concentrations
must be removed. A higher residual risk would allow the removal of only the
more contaminated fraction. The incremental materials risk associated with
removing the less contaminated soil decreases with the reduction in
contamination concentration, though at a slower rate than the decrease in
concentration because the excavation process can be expected to create dust
and to volatilize chemicals, both of which increase exposure to the
contaminants. 2  The Region V RODs noted a number of these effects.253 The
incremental conventional risks associated with digging and hauling remain the
same, however.254 Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between marginal risk
per unit of remediation activity and concentration of contaminants in soil.
255
251. For example, if the source is a spill, the contamination would radiate dowyn in a half-sphere
or column. If it is airborne deposition, the gradient would be horizontal with lower levels of soil having
less contamination than levels closer to the surface.
252. See Brett et al., supra note 64, passim (assessing the risks of excavating waste lagoons).
253. See, e.g., St. Louis River, Duluth, Minn., EPA ID MND039045430 (Sept. 28, 1990),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (air emissions); Fisher Calo Chem, Kingsbury, Ind., EPA ID
1ND074315896 (Aug. 7, 1990), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (contaminated material in
general); Wayne Waste Oil, Columbia City, Ind., EPA ID 1ND048989479 (Mar. 30, 1990), available in
WL, Database EDR-ROD (worker exposure to volatile chemicals); Hedblum Indus., Oscoda, Mich.,
EPA ID MID980794408 (Sept. 29, 1989), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (other air
contaminants); Auto Ion Chems., Inc., Kalamazoo, Mich., EPA ID MID980794382 (Sept. 27, 1989),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (uncovering and disturbing waste); Pristine, Inc., Reading, Ohio,
EPA ID OHD076773712 (Dec. 31, 1987), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (increase in dust
generation).
254. The construction and transportation risk data reported in Part I do not show any distinctions
among rates of conventional risk based on differences in the hazardousness of the material. The per-mile
injury and fatality rates for transportation, for example, remain constant. See supra Subsections I.B. 1, 3,
5.
255. Marginal risk, of course, is to be distinguished from total risk. The marginal risk reflects the
value of each increment only; therefore, total risk increases additively even though the marginal risk
does not.
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FIGURE 6
Remediation Risk and Contaminant Levels
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The more dirt that is moved, in other words, and the more time that is
spent moving it, the higher the total conventional risk will be.256 Moreover, as
we have seen, the conventional remediation risks tend to exceed the materials
risks, so the dominant effect of increased risk reduction will be increased
conventional remedial risk. The Hanford DEIS, for example, reasoned that (i)
conventional risks occur at predictable rates related to the type of construction
activity and the number of labor hours spent on that particular activity, and (ii)
construction activities have the highest accident rates. Therefore, remedial
alternatives with a high number of construction labor hours would have a high
number of injuries and fatalities.2"7 Some RODs note the benefit of reducing
the amount of soil excavated, 258 and they occasionally remove the excavation
component from a selected remedy altogether259 or reduce its scope.260 There
256. This was the basis of the plaintiffs' unsuccessful challenge in United States v. NL Indus.,
936 F. Supp. 545, 554-56 (S.D. I11. 1996). The choice of a 500 parts per million (ppm) residual lead
level in soil instead of a 1000 ppm level would result in the generation of much greater quantities of
waste material that would have to be transported from the site. The city and the potentially responsible
parties were arguing for the higher lead (and higher risk) level.
257. See HANFORD DEIS, supra note 57, at S-22 to S-23; Hoskin et al., supra note 5, at 1013-15.
258. See Kummer Sanitary Landfill, Northern Township, Minn., EPA ID MND980904049 (Sept.
30, 1988), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (disturbing only minimal volumes of in-place waste
during construction activities); Allied Chem. & Ironton Coke, Ironton, Ohio, EPA ID OHD043730217
(Sept. 29, 1988), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (disturbing hazardous waste as little as
possible).
259. See Kentwood Landfill, Kentwood, Mich., EPA ID MID000260281 (Mar. 29, 1991),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD (eliminating one remedy due to excavation of landfill waste
which would increase the potential for exposure to hazardous constituents by contact and inhalation);
Hagen Farm, Stoughton, Wis., EPA ID WID980610059 (Sept. 17, 1990), available in WL, Database
EDR-ROD (posing minimal risks due to the fact that the waste would not be excavated); Hedblum
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was a similar result in Usaviex,2 61 where a RCRA cap was not selected due to
the increase in risk from excavation and exposure to contaminated soil.
Another Region V ROD, Lakeland Disposal Services Inc.,262 was confronted
with the same choice between a landfill cap and a RCRA cap. A landfill cap
was selected, but the ROD stated that the differences between a landfill cap
and a RCRA cap would not affect short-term risk. This is difficult to
understand when the RCRA cap remedy obviously takes longer and requires
more construction activity than the landfill cap. Some remediation activities
may not follow this pattern, but any remedy with sustained construction or
transportation activity necessarily does.2 63  Even pumping and treating
groundwater, which involves only start-up construction risks, can have a
continuing detrimental effect on neighboring aquifers, which is an
environmental short-term risk.
The method of remediation also affects the magnitude of short-term risk.
On the one hand, access restrictions and institutional land-use controls have
almost no remedial risks. Off-site treatment and disposal, on the other hand,
increase the amount of transportation, which is a major risk item. Since the
risks of transportation are dominated by conventional (viz., accident) risks, the
total risk increases at a constant rate as the volume of material being moved
increases, as Figure 6 suggests.26 The more miles that are driven, the more
accidents will occur and the more people are potentially exposed to
contaminated material, a fact noted in several of the Region V RODs. 265 Thus,
the choice of a transportation-reliant remedy is the choice of substantial
remediation risks to project workers and the public.
Indus., Oscoda, Mich., EPA ID MID980794408 (Sept. 29, 1989), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD
(avoiding excavation in the selected remedy which would have increased dust generation and exposed
workers to VOCs).
260. For example, the installation of a multilayer cap designed for hazardous waste sites takes
longer and requires more extensive construction activities than the installation of an ordinary landfill
cap. The ROD for one Ohio site therefore selected the less elaborate solid waste landfill cap, noting that
it provided less long-term effectiveness but greater short-term effectiveness. See Buckeye Reclamation,
St. Clairsville, Ohio, EPA ID OHD980509657 (Aug. 19, 1991), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD.
The difference was 1.3 million cubic yards versus II million cubic yards of earth to be moved. See id.
261. Usaviex, Niles, Mich., EPA ID MID980794556 (Sept. 7, 1988), available in WL, Database
EDR-ROD.
262. Lakeland Disposal Servs. Inc., Claypool, Ind., EPA ID IND064703200 (Sept. 28, 1993),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD.
263. See Hoskin et al., supra note 5, at 1012-15.
264. See Mar et al., supra note 5, at 133-34.
265. See City Disposal Sanitary Landfill, Dunn, Wis., EPA ID WID980610646 (Sept. 29, 1992),
available in WL, Database EDR-ROD; Carter Indus. Site, Detroit, Mich., EPA ID MID980274179
(Sept. 18, 1991), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD; St. Louis River, Duluth, Minn., EPA ID
MND039045430 (Sept. 28, 1990), available in WL, Database EDR-ROD; Oak Grove Landfill, Oak
Grove Township, Minn., EPA ID MND980904056 (Sept. 30, 1988), available in WL, Database EDR-
ROD.
Vol. 15:269, 1998
Short Changing Short-Term Risk
The EPA's nearly universal preference for depth over breadth (that is,
going after fewer sources, but demanding more of each of them)266 may need
to be reconsidered at sites where remediation risks are high. In the extreme
case, a thorough consideration of the risks of the remedy could encourage the
abandonment of substantial remediation efforts in favor of access restrictions
only. These will be rare cases,267 but it must be an active option where
remediation risks are uncontrollable. For the vast majority of cases, a full
understanding of remediation risks is simply a means of ensuring informed
decisionmaking, and that will lead in the long run to different choices being
made.
2. Risk Receptors
The selected remedy also has a profound effect on who (or what) is
subjected to remediation risks. Incineration as a method of treatment, for
example, tends to have similar materials risk effects on workers and the
neighboring population as a result of exposure to air emissions 268  or
particulate dispersion,269 whereas excavation imposes far greater conventional
risks on workers and ecosystems. It is not inappropriate to think of these
choices of remedy (and therefore of receptors) as transfers of risk among
subpopulations. 20  The question here is who will bear the risks of
remediation.27' To take a previous example, organic layer removal of forest
soil is the most effective way to protect the local public from Chemobyl
fallout. It imposes few remediation risks on the public (a forest is sparsely
populated, so dust is not a problem), but it has huge excavation,
266. See Applegate, supra note 12, at 1672-73 (discussing depth versus breadth in the context of
the Clean Air Act); Cross, supra note 5, at 912-13; Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 5, at 37 (noting
that U.S. regulation heavily emphasizes prevention of fatalities over nonfatal injuries and illnesses).
267. See, e.g., DYcus, supra note 71, at 112 (describing the cesium-137 contamination of lake
sediments at the DOE's Savannah River site).
268. See Pristine, Inc., Reading, Ohio, EPA ID OHD076773712 (Mar. 30, 1990), available in
WL, Database EDR-ROD.
269. See Usaviex, Niles, Mich., EPA ID MID980794556 (Sept. 7, 1988), available in WL,
Database EDR-ROD.
270. For more information on risk transfers, see generally RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 5;
Viscusi, supra note 5. The general problem in environmental law of transferring risk from the public at
large to workers has been noted in several contexts. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 8, at 12-13 (discussing
risks to asbestos abatement workers); RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 5, at 22-25 (classifying the types of
risk trade-offs); Cross, supra note 5, at 872 (discussing risks to workers from pesticides); Inhaber, supra
note 28, at 720-21 (comparing worker and public risks from different energy production technologies).
271. Of course, the decision to undertake active remediation at all involves some burden-shifting
from the neighboring public to remediation workers. In terms of "life years lost," as opposed to simple
fatalities, the transfer is dramatic. As Cohen et al. demonstrate in their hypothetical case study, the types
of injury and age of the victim result in much higher numbers of life years lost per worker than per
neighbor. See Cohen et al., supra note 4, at 422.
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transportation, and ecological consequences. 272 The transportation of large
waste volumes affects the neighboring public, but it also spreads the per-mile
risk across a broader area.
It should go without saying that basic choices regarding who will be
subjected to how much risk should not be ignored, made inadvertently, chosen
in ignorance, or hidden.273 For example, even if worker risk is heavily
discounted as the result of a judgment that such risk is counterbalanced by
voluntariness or the risks of alternative employment, such normative
principles do not obviate the utility and necessity of an evaluation of the
factual effects of our judgments. 274 At some point, voluntariness and
alternative risks may no longer outweigh a rising tide of worker injury.
Putting aside the malignant effect of selective knowledge on the
decisionmaking process, the failure to take adequate account of remediation
risk effectively shields the selection of high-risk remedies from review by the
public, who are entitled to comment on the proposed plan,275 and by the
courts, whose review is limited in time and in scope but to which aggrieved
citizens have a right to turn.
B. Directions for Change
If the 105th Congress succeeds where its immediate predecessors have
failed in reauthorizing and revising CERCLA, there will shortly be an
opportunity to reform the NCP to take better account of remediation risk and
to require a better accounting of remediation risk from RPMs. CERCLA itself
does not require substantial reworking in terms of remediation risk. As we
have seen, it contains ample authority for considering remediation risk. To the
extent that it expresses a preference for long-term risk reduction, that is a
policy choice which our study does not challenge. The proposals in Superfund
reform bills to eliminate ARAR compliance and the preference for
treatmene76 would probably have the beneficial but indirect effect of raising
the status of remediation risk. However, the implications (many of them
negative) of such major changes go far beyond the problem that we have
272. See Linkov et al., supra note 81, at 69.
273. For example, the kind of detailed analysis that Suter et al. advocate for ecological risk is
impossible if the data are not developed in the first place. See Suter et al., supra note 85, at 228-29; see
also Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 5, at 20-21, 38.
274. Cf Linda Ross Meyer, Just the Facts?, 106 YALE L.J. 1269, 1311 (1997) (book review)
(explaining the need to consider the costs and collateral consequences of tort rules, even if the theoretical
underpinnings of the rules do not recognize such facts as determinative).
275. See CERCLA § 117(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(0(3) (1997).
276. See Special Report: Commerce Panel GOP Floats Draft Remedy, NRD Plans in Bipartisan
Talks, INSIDE EPA's SUPERFUND REP., July 21, 1997, at I (newsletter on file with the authors)
(reprinting draft committee language on remedy selection revisions).
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sought to identify. There is no need to exclude criteria such as ARARs in
order to do a better job of including the criterion of remediation risk.
The NCP and associated guidance, on the other hand, are in large part
responsible for the EPA's failure to consider remediation risk in remedy
selection. As Part II of this Article demonstrated, the NCP greatly strengthens
the statutory preference for long-term and permanent remedies in a number of
ways. Therefore, one goal of the post-reauthorization revision of the NCP
should be the restoration of the statutory balance between short- and long-
term concerns. A first step toward this goal is the renaming of the criterion to
"remediation risk reduction" or "implementation risk reduction." The level of
confusion regarding the meaning of "short-term effectiveness" among the
EPA's own employees is embarrassingly high, and it needs to addressed.
As a first step, RPMs need more explicit guidance on remediation risk. To
ignore it altogether, as The RPM Primer does, sends a clear message that it is
utterly unimportant in clean-up decisions. The EPA should also remove or
revise the directions for the actual balancing process that emphasize long-term
risk and permanence within the balancing criteria category while not even
mentioning remediation risks.277 This goes beyond simply sending mixed
signals on remediation risk. It is a virtual directive to ignore remediation risk,
and our study shows that this part of the NCP has been understood and
followed as such.
A second goal of reform should be to require full disclosure of
remediation risks on equal terms with other data, so that they can be fully
considered by the EPA and the public. Textually, one could add more
comprehensive and clearer descriptions of the meaning of remediation risk
and require more thorough discussion of the issue in the proposed plan. Full
disclosure in the proposed plan is especially important in view of the
limitations on judicial review, as it may be the only meaningful opportunity to
change the decision.
We do not yet advocate the further step of a general requirement for
quantitative risk-risk analysis.278 The idea of requiring risk comparisons to
ensure that environmental remedies do not make the situation worse is not
new."' But the difficulties of comparing risks, quantitatively or otherwise, are
numerous and extremely controversial. As the comparative risk literature
points out,280 comparative risk assessment poses both methodological
277. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(l)(ii)(E) (1997).
278. For discussions of the need for risk-risk analysis, see RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 5, at
246-60; Cross, supra note 5, at 920-24; and Viscusi, supra note 5, at 5-6.
279. See Inhaber, supra note 28, at 18; Chauncey Starr & Chris Whipple, Risks of Risk
Decisions, 208 SCIENCE 1114 (1980).
280. See generally Applegate, supra note 12, at 1658-60; John S. Applegate, Comparative Risk
Assessment and Environmental Priorities Projects, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 71 (1998); Adam Finkel,
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difficulties, such as identifying a feasible common unit of measurement and
obtaining the large amounts of data required, and normative difficulties, such
as the appropriateness of the common metric and the relative weight to be
given to various risks and risk receptors. The present study has not addressed
these issues, though we hope that it provides an empirical basis for such
work.28'
There are, in any event, limits to what one can realistically expect to
accomplish through revisions of statutes and regulations. In any plausible
version of the revised statute, CERCLA will require the weighing of several
disparate factors to come up with remedy selections in particular cases.
Superfund sites are simply too diverse and too complex to admit of one- or
two-dimensional rules of decision. Consequently, remedy selection will
always be to a large extent discretionary and case-specific. Beyond full
disclosure of relevant data and the clear, consistent articulation of factors and
preferences, there is little that additional directive language can accomplish.
This seems particularly true in light of our findings that misunderstandings
and a failure to follow the requirements of the NCP are commonplace in
remedy selection. These shortcomings are the result of internal
communication failures and of problems in legal and program supervision.
Therefore, these are the areas in which the most immediately effective
opportunities for reform lie.
Conclusion
One of the distinctive features of CERCLA among environmental
protection statutes is its lengthy, labor-intensive, and relatively dangerous
remediation phase. This transition period cannot be ignored by those who are
directly involved in the clean-up of a Superfund facility, and it should not be
ignored by site-specific remedy selectors or national policymakers. Yet, from
all indications, remediation risks are consistently undervalued and even
dismissed in the remedy selection process, both as a matter of implied policy
and of common practice. Our review of 113 remedial actions from EPA
Region V confirmed these indications and revealed a further troubling fact-
many EPA decisionmakers seem not to understand fully how remediation risk
fits into the remedy selection process.
Solving the remedy selection problem is not an easy task. The relevant
statutory language, while not a model of clarity, already adequately conveys
Comparing Risks Thoughtfully, 7 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 325 (1996); Donald T. Hornstein,
Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L.
REv. 562 (1992); Ellen K. Silbergeld, The Risks of Comparing Risks, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 405 (1995);
Symposium, Setting Environmental Priorities: The Debate About Risk, EPA J., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 17.
281. See Applegate, supra note S.
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the importance of remediation risk. The NCP does require attention, and we
have suggested some key changes. The most pressing need, therefore, is for
better compliance with the existing regulatory directions governing the
consideration of remediation risk. While entrenched patterns of agency
behavior are not easily changed, a vigorous program of communication and
supervision would result in a Superfund remedy selection process that is better
informed and more sensitive to its effects on remediation workers,
surrounding populations, and ecosystems.

